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ABSTRACT 
Most of the hospitals in the USA carry out their purchasing of supplies, including 
pharmaceuticals, through Group Purchasing Organizations (GPO). GPO is an organization, 
which aggregates procuring volumes of their member hospitals and negotiates low prices from 
manufacturers or vendors. According to 2013 statistics, 98% of hospitals in U.S. are purchasing 
their bulk health care products through GPOs, and it saves U.S. health care industry 
approximately $36 billion annually. Through these hospitals enjoy advantages by purchasing 
through their GPOs, there are some disadvantages such as paying membership fees to their 
GPOs, restricting the purchasing power of the hospitals outside their GPOs, making it more 
complicated to buy better or advanced products from new vendors. As various political and 
economic factors are forcing hospitals merge into large hospital associations, the concept of 
self-contracting or managing supplies directly, comes into the picture. 
In this research, the concepts of healthcare supply chains with GPOs are described in detail. 
Purchasing systems under self- contracting are then discussed. Three possible options for the 
hospitals are then examined, namely, continuing current purchasing through their GPOs, direct 
purchasing from manufacturers (self –contracting), and finally, forming an association with other 
hospitals and purchasing through this association. The preferable options are discussed under 
the concepts of Game Theory. This research also examines the changes needed in the supply 
chain if any of the above new options is selected.
v 
 
A regular supply-chain consists of Hospital, GPO, and vendor or manufacturer. As healthcare 
delivery systems are merging into one group or forming hospital associations, they have an 
additional option of carrying out their purchasing through these associations. In this work, it is 
assumed that the individual hospitals take their decisions based on total costs of supplies, and 
they chose the supplier by comparing the various options available. In this research, these 
questions are answered by following a game-theoretic model, by making some assumptions. 
Concepts of game theory such as Nash equilibrium, Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE), 
etc. are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
The Healthcare system is a system in which many components interact and work resulting in 
delivering the best healthcare services to the patient. This system comprises of four major 
constituents, providers, facilities where the healthcare is provided, pharmaceuticals, and 
medical equipment operators. In the period of the contest, no industry can persist without 
considering much about cutting down expenses wherever feasible. The same is accurate for the 
healthcare industry, which is observing an apparent rise in cost in most of all its goods and 
services. The supply chain in this industry being a notable driver of price is, therefore, seizing all 
the recognition from industry stakeholders. The healthcare supply-chain concerns the flow of 
various product types and the cooperation of many stakeholders. 
1.1 Introduction to healthcare supply chain: 
 
The principal objective of the healthcare supply chain is to deliver commodities promptly, to 
meet the needs of providers. Based on their duties, stakeholders in the healthcare supply-chain 
can be classified into three major groups: producers, buyers, and providers. Supply-chain 
management in healthcare should guarantee total end-to-end distinctness of information among 
suppliers, producers, wholesalers and consumers. 
1.2 Introduction to Group Purchasing Organization (GPO): 
 
Group Purchasing Organizations have turned out to be exceptionally critical of the healthcare 
industry. The GPOs have for the most part get to be prevalent in healthcare services, training, 
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and government associations. The current health care industry is facing with the lot of pressure 
to chop down costs and intense competition among health care providers, which resulted in 
merging and attainments leading to a large size of suppliers. The most incessant reason given 
by health care providers to be partnered with a GPO is profitable contractual conditions. The 
current GPOs have changed the traditional strategy for acquiring products. The enormous 
pressure of bringing down the costs has for the most part been valuable to the end client, which 
for our situation is a client to a health care center. 
A GPO is a formal and efficient organization that enables the alliance of procurements for many 
organizations (Nollet 2005). The subcontracting of procuring to GPOs has eased healthcare 
centers with an emphasis on their critical areas like giving proper healthcare. This has removed 
the load of buying operations, which many healthcare centers are facing formerly. According to 
recent statistics, 72% of the purchases are done through GPO contracts. According to the study 
conducted by Schneller (2009), these organizations save about 36 billion dollars every year for 
U.S. healthcare industry. By registering with these agencies, the providers are saving a lot of 
time and money by losing the burden of negotiating contracts and processing a lot of individual 
contracts. According to this study, some hospitals who are not proceeding through GPOs are 
spending a lot of money ($600,000 to $800,000) every year for operations and maintenance of 
staff, money that could be spent on appointing new doctors and staff and provide the best 
health services to their patients. Also, negotiating contracts they also assist their members by 
giving them extra services.  
The primary function of group purchasing is to attain lower prices, safeguard price shield, and 
executing enhanced quality programs, reduced contracting costs and checking market 
situations regularly. Other than volume discounts, GPOs are helping health care members by 
delivering primary services such as supply chain management. They assist the health care 
providers by creating an online domain for their procurement use. They introduce new 
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technologies or existing technologies such as Barcoding to their members to manage their 
inventories. They also help them by suggesting any new medications, and educating them 
about new equipment. In addition, GPOs work with their client providers in making their supply 
chains more efficient by providing managerial insights into their operations. Schneller proposed 
that “product standardization” and “entering into GPO contracts” where the primary cost 
reducing strategies to be followed. While making a contract with a GPO, the health care 
member should evaluate the performance and quality of the suppliers as well as the GPOs 
purchasing power (Schneller 2000). 
GPO ‘s from the Hospitals perspective: 
• The agglomeration of purchasing power through GPOs have permitted clinics to bring 
down their procurement costs altogether. 
• Hospitals administrators are not showing any interest in buying the required goods out of 
the GPO contract because they are in fear of losing manufacturers’ rebates as well as 
the portion of administrative fees, which is spent by the GPO. 
• The hospitals are thinking in administrative expenses, so they always purchase through 
GPOs. This is why because GPOs can reduce the number of products and 
pharmaceuticals in the hospital formulary there by reducing the inventory costs. 
GPOs from the Vendor's perspective: 
Simply to say, if the vendor wants to increase their market share, they have to deal with the 
GPOs, as the contract duration is increasing and higher in purchasing volumes can be 
achieved. 
1.3 Hospital Association:  
All across America, hospitals are merging. Hospital officials who create the mergers believe that 
hospital consolidation enhances the efficiency, access and quality of care, and may reduce 
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costs as, in theory, the more care a hospital provides, the higher efficient and less costly it 
should become. For instance, when a smaller hospital merges with a larger hospital system, 
patients at the smaller hospital may obtain enough access to specialists and advanced 
therapeutic technologies, such as high-tech imaging methods and automated medical record 
systems. According to Harvard health publications, there were 95 mergers, acquisitions, and 
joint ventures between U.S. hospitals in the year 2014. Using the same concept of merging, but 
the consolidation of supplies between the hospitals as one of the alternatives of purchasing is 
employed in this thesis.  The “Hospital Association” can also be stated as, hospitals are trying to 
form large associations to combine their resources and at the same time cut down their costs.  
1.4 Objectives And Significance: 
 
In this thesis, our fundamental goal is to look at three procurement models, concerning 
purchasing costs by two healthcare members. This study mainly involves in comparing the three 
scenarios featuring a healthcare organization procuring through its GPO, acquiring through self-
sourcing (purchasing directly from manufacturers) and finally through a hybrid model, which 
involves in forming an association of hospitals and acquire required products. The items 
procured by the hospitals can be classified mainly into two types, surgical and pharmaceutical 
products and physician prescribed items. Physician prescribed products are not purchased in 
bulk, and these elements are excluded in this work. The items, which are bought in bulk, are 
considered and used for comparison. Apart from procurement costs, membership fees and 
administrative fees are also considered in analyzing the model. Our model analyzes the cost 
efficiency of all the scenarios basing on the situations and highlights the best possible solution.  
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Figure 1.1: Procurement scenarios used for comparison 
In this research, the comparison study is done using game theoretic models, in which the cost 
equations are considered as payoff points, and the detailed explanation is given in the 
procedure chapter. 
Objective: The main objective is to find a preferable low cost option of purchasing for the 
hospitals using Game theory concepts.  
Game Theory: “Game theory is the formal study of conflict and cooperation. Game theoretic 
concepts apply whenever the actions of several agents are interdependent. These agents may 
be individuals, groups, firms, or any combination of these. The concepts of game theory provide 
a language to formulate, structure, analyze, and understand strategic scenarios.” It is an 
essential tool that helps us to get to know about the situations in which there is a strategic 
cooperation among the decision makers. Decision makers frequently encounter a 'conflict-of-
interest' situation, and each of them intends to get the best advantage out of it. This kind of 
circumstances arises in most areas. The concept of Best response is used to find the Nash 
equilibrium is used in this thesis, which gives the preferable option of purchasing. 
1.4.1 Broader Impact Of The Research: 
This research helps to identify whether cost savings can be achieved using a hybrid model or 
not. It will also determine the optimal or best preferable option for purchasing products basing 
on the scenarios stated in this research. 
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1.5 Organization Of Research:  
 
The rest of the report is organized as follows: In section 2, the explanation about the earlier 
study on purchasing and on the game theory concepts is given; The working of GPOs and what 
facilitates the inclination towards the self contracting are discussed in section 3; The in detail 
explanation of Nash equilibrium and the models are developed in chapter 4 and 5 respectively. 
Finally, conclusions and future work are discussed in chapter 6 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Healthcare General Purchasing Organizations (GPOs) are major players in most of the 
healthcare organizations’ supply chains. A Recent survey conducted by Burns and Lee in 2008, 
reviewed GPOs from their member’s perspective. Based on 94% survey results, they reported 
that GPOs succeeded in lessening health care prices by dropping product costs, especially for 
commodity and pharmaceutical products. 
Hu and Schwarz (2011) review some of the contentions about GPOs by a Hoteling design. The 
providers determine whether to establish a GPO while negotiating a price for the producers. 
They record that forming a GPO intensifies competition among manufacturers, thus reducing 
costs for healthcare members. They further illustrate that the presence of moderate off-contract 
rates is not an indication of anticompetitive course on the part of GPOs.  
One of the most common concerns dealt in the current literature is about the ideal size of GPOs 
and the benefits which healthcare organizations gain by associating with a GPO. There is a 
general accord that connection with a GPO, in fact, results in cost savings. Member loyalty has 
a huge role to play in the success of a GPO and also the increase of member registration 
depends on it (Nollet, 2002). W. R. Doucette showed that the transparency in sharing of data 
among the members and the trust concerns shape the success of GPOs by generating a high 
member commitment (Doucette, 1997)
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The significant portion of literature discusses costs, and the cost is saving privileges enjoyed by 
the healthcare organizations. Any health care center associated with a GPO benefit from three 
types of cost reductions: price, administrative expenses and utilization costs (Anderson 1998). 
The affiliation to a GPO can produce savings up to 10 to 15 percent, which is a direct cost 
saving (Hendrick 1997) and (Schneller 2000). The healthcare organizations can employ the 
savings generated in essential areas, which relate directly to the quality of health care. 
Chapman (1998) suggested that the real profits in the healthcare savings arise from product 
standardization. However, certain types of purchases like products are suited for larger gains, 
and certain purchasing groups may enforce uniformity by forcing health care centers to use all 
the goods in the package (Nollet, 2005). 
However, it is found that there has been a lack of work related to the comparison of 
procurement models through self-sourcing, national GPO sourcing, and through associations. 
Most of the earlier or present literature has identified economic and noneconomic costs 
associated with a GPO (Dobler, 1996; Anderson, 1998; Chapman, 1998, and Schneller, 2000), 
but there has been no direct comparison between three different procurement models. Also, 
most of the earlier research has just considered noneconomic costs like loss of independence of 
physicians and barrier to entry of innovative products (Zweig, 1998) and (Elhauge, 2002). 
In this work the proposed methodology is the game theory, which is used to analyze the 
solution. Game theory is useful when other players in the system are also making decisions and 
each player’s decision depends on the individual decisions taken by other players. Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern introduced the concept of Game Theory. Game theory has 
branched out to incorporate many other business methods, from optimal purchasing campaign 
strategies, war strategies, traditional auction tactics, and voting methods. For instance, 
pharmaceutical organizations probably face divisional issues on whether to advertise an item 
instantly and obtain a competitive advantage over competing firms, or delay the testing time of 
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the medication. Hu et al., (2011) applied game theory for analyzing the impact of GPOs on 
healthcare product supply chains. They used game theory concepts for checking whether 
contract administration fee affects the purchasing costs of the providers. They used the single 
product for analyses, but GPOs pricing frequently involves bundles of products. They 
considered two non-cooperative games, one that includes GPOs and another that does not, 
making an assumption that every player is aware of payoffs of other players. There is an 
enormous operation/supply chain management literature on contracting [Cachon (2003)], but 
not much research related to GPOs or other contracting mediators. Considering a monopoly 
producer that offers a "linear quantity discount" to competing retailers, Chen, and Roma (2011) 
distinguishes circumstances under which a GPO will form. In all these articles, the retailers’ 
demands are price elastic, depending on the retail costs. 
Another stream of study involves the distribution of some of the union gains back to its 
members, the balance of allocation, and the establishment of the association through a 
cooperative game framework. In particular, Schotanus et al. (2008) and Nagarajan et al. (2008) 
analyzed how a GPO can designate cost savings amongst its members. The following research 
further examines the stability of the GPO under various allocation rules. Also, there is a 
substantial amount of effort in the economics literature on the fair division of joint costs or 
excess (e.g., Moulin 1995, 1996; Friedman and Moulin 1999; Friedman 2004). 
2.1 Development Of Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs): 
 
The Hospital Bureau of New York established the First GPO in 1910. Today, there are more 
than 600 GPOs in the United States, with about 98% of the care providing systems being 
members of GPOs. The overall savings for the members could go up to $866.4 billion (HSCA, 
2014). The six largest PO’s have more than 3000 members each.  
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The United States Congress has not kept any restriction on administration fees, but it appointed 
United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to review and oversee whether 
the GPOs are exceeding their administrative costs more than 3%, as it exempted the GPOs 
from anti-federal kickback. Judging by the fee structure, it does help a GPO if it grows larger in 
size. 
In 2002, the Senate developed a code of conduct for every GPO to subscribe to and follow 
correctly. Otherwise, they are imposed on severe charges. This growth in the number of GPOs 
ended in intense competition among the members in a volatile pricey market. GPOs could not 
expand by joining members as most of the organizations are already enrolled in one of the 
GPOs for purchasing their products (Nollet, 2002). To stay loose with the competition, GPOs 
began extending supplementary services, which promote the operational performance of a 
healthcare organization. These duties include supply chain management, ambulatory care, HR 
management, inventory management, etc., 
2.2 Applications Of Game Theory: 
 
“These concepts are widely used in electrical engineering and computer science engineering 
from wireless networks to defense applications, from Internet security to Cybernetics, electricity 
marketing to image processing and coding, electromagnetic apparatus design to electrical 
vehicles, spectrum access to MIMO (Memory input and Memory output) systems, cognitive 
radio to target tracking, etc. For example, a survey of game-theoretic solutions applied to 
improve network security were listed and different game-theoretic solutions, together with their 
limitations, were discussed in Wireless networks are highly susceptible to jamming attacks, due 
to their broadcast nature”(IIE journal, 2016). Game theory provides powerful tools for modeling 
and analyzing such attacks. Effective playing strategy in information warfare was discussed in, 
where the game theory was used to study information warfare with mathematical models. A 
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game-theoretical approach was also used to optimize the design of the configuration of 
electromagnetic apparatuses (Anastasopoulos, 2012). 
Of course, all of the players are involved in playing and attempting to modify the game. This is 
the second valuable supplement of the game theory framework: a focus on the entire player 
prospects, rather than only your company's perspective. Players must predict player actions and 
effects as the game is being played. This multidimensional aspect is essential for knowing who 
the opposition is and why? 
For example, many hospital organizations focused principally on their hospital contestants 
rather than the competitors who were having a bigger influence on them—managed-care 
organizations. The insurers changed the players and the tactics to boost their value added to 
and derived from the game. 
Finally, game theory presents the notion of changing the game by involving other players in 
cooperation and competition in a style that produces “win-win” rather than “win-lose” 
consequences. Health reformation generates many possibilities for hospitals, physicians, and 
insurers to associate together in this way. Game theory contributes the perfect form to test the 
strategic usefulness of these options and to design new fundamental relationships that “change 
the game” for the better
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CHAPTER 3 – DESCRIPTION OF GROUP PURCHASING 
ORGANIZATIONS 
A Group Purchasing Organization (GPO) is an organization, which facilitates supplies to its 
member healthcare providers. GPOs procurement strategy involves in better operational links 
with vendors resulting in shorter lead times and better efficiency, and this benefits the end 
customer with lower costs. GPOs also implement "joint purchasing programs" to clinicians and 
other healthcare bodies. 
The domains where GPOs use their leverage in negotiating the prices are office facilities, 
dietary, laboratory, diagnostic imaging, pharmacy, IT, insurance, and maintenance (Burns, 
2002). Aside from negotiating prices, a GPO works as a tool for price protection for its members 
as it operates as a connection among a large number of suppliers and the healthcare company. 
In the past, GPOs granted their members the same regulated pricing irrespective of the quantity 
they acquired. This proved to be beneficial to the smaller members, and the bigger opponents 
felt that they had to bear the responsibility of subsidizing the smaller ones (Burns 2002). 
Nevertheless, the concept of “tiered pricing” (Burns 2002) has come into force recently, which 
links the pricing of goods to the quantities, the members’ purchase. 
General services offered by GPOs:
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• Other than volume discounts, GPOs are helping health care members by delivering 
primary services such are mentioned below. Managing an intricate system of procuring 
products in the health care industry. 
• Offering e-commerce solutions for health care members for facilitating efficient 
procurement process. 
• Helping the hospitals in managing their inventory by introducing the methods of 
Barcoding etc.  
• The GPOs maintain their vendor networks by making proper dealings so that even 
vendor can enjoy the benefits. They ask for a dispensing fee of the products also. 
• The GPOs educate the clinicians in the hospitals about the new products, and new 
machines entered into the market for easy usage. 
• Quality check is the primary service given by GPO to the hospital, as they raise some 
enactment risks with some medicines and this process is considered crucial for the 
GPO. In addition to these, they also help hospital members in data analysis, supply 
chain management works, ambulatory care, allowing them to increase their staff, 
suggesting new medications, setting up proper fire aids in the hospital, improving their 
operations, etc. 
3.1 Impact Of Purchasing Groups: 
 
The purchasing groups act a critical role in the manipulation of the materials prices. The largest 
players in the market utilize their advantage with the supplier following in the wiping out of the 
smaller members who lack the negotiating ability. Due to the substantial market share by the 
prominent commanding members, entry of small members into the market becomes tight (Sethi 
2006). It is acutely costly for a new competitor to obtain considerable market share since most 
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of the potential clients are affiliated with existing GPOs by various contractual agreements 
(Sethi 2006).  The growth of larger purchasing groups may end up with a benefit to the current 
vendors as fewer quantity suppliers may fall out in an active price market although their product 
may be technologically excellent. This will concern the quality of products in the future. 
3.2 Classification Of GPOs: 
 
GPOs can be classified based on their membership, geographic scope, possession, and size 
(Burns 2002). When GPOs are classified based on ownership, they are listed as for-profit, non-
profit and public GPOs (Burns 2002). The two largest for-profit GPOs are divisions of the two 
most important investors-owned hospital systems: HCA (Health Trust Purchasing Group) and 
Tenet (Buy Power) (Burns 2002). The three biggest nonprofit GPOs are hospital cooperatives 
like Novation, which is a group-purchasing arm for VHA/UHC (Burns 2002). The most massive 
public GPO is the VA. Healthcare organizations, which are a part of for-profit and the VA 
systems, are more committed to their group purchasing contracts. Healthcare organizations 
within the nonprofit alliances join their GPOs voluntarily (Burns 2002). 
GPOs also vary in the type of membership. Some GPOs are bound to the larger healthcare 
companies where as some of them focus on smaller clients like ambulatory centers and 
practitioner’s offices. Many GPOs try to focus on two types of the market to have a substantial 
presence (Burns 2002). 
Many GPOs differ in their extent to cater to various markets. Some or rather smaller players 
concentrate on local healthcare organizations. This assists them to merge their resources and 
sometimes function properly in logistical operations than National players. Large GPOs focus on 
a National level. They have a better reach that is promoted by their economic muscle and 
quantities of purchases. 
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3.3 Services Offered By GPOs: 
 
GPOs have progressed over the last few decades from basic claims managers to more complex 
administrations offering an extensive range of prescription drug controlling tools. Furthermore, 
offering their elementary services – Providing discounted contracts, claims handling, record 
protection, and reporting agendas – GPOs offer their clients a wide range of services together 
with the drug application review, disease supervision. GPOs also assist customers by forming 
their benefits configuration.  
Some other core services listed out below other than providing huge rebates to the member 
hospitals, they are, 
Formularies: GPOs use formularies (higher quantities) to negotiate high price discounts with 
manufacturers, established price-sharing stages to impact beneficiary consumption charges, 
and boost recipients to practice a mix of chosen or lower-price covered goods. 
Rebates: GPOs negotiate with manufacturers for discounts on items designated for the 
formulary. Discount amounts are created by the contracts negotiated between the GPO and 
members and the GPO and producers. Typically, bonds are organized so that GPOs hold a 
portion of the discount in an altercation for increasing the formulary and negotiating with 
manufacturers. 
Pharmacy Networks: These networks contain drug stores that have approved to dispense 
recommended drugs and provide pharmacy services to the members who are enrolled in the 
health plan. These networks can be comprehensive or constricted. These networks let GPOs 
reduce drug expenses by negotiating the compensation rate and administration fee with 
pharmacies. 
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Claims Settlement: All GPOs use an actual, “point-of-sale” scheme related to wholesale and 
mail-order pharmacies and delivery hubs. This procedure offers confirmation of coverage, 
formulary limitations, and drug contacts. This method also delivers prescription drug info. Back 
at the GPO data granary, where it can be used for modified reportage and “quality-focused” 
medical and interference agendas. 
Quality-Focused Plans: GPOs improve programs that deliver disease controlling, agreement 
strategies, and other medical expertise endorsing the safe, cultivated use of prescription drugs. 
GPOs usually do not take physical control of recommended drugs when carrying out their core 
pharmacological running functions. Though, in their “mail-order” and “specialty-pharmacy” 
businesses, GPOs purchase medicines from retailers or manufacturers and distribute them 
directly to patients in a way analogous to other dispensaries. 
3.4 Flow Of Products From Manufacturers To Hospital Members In The Supply Chain: 
 
Manufacturers: 
Manufacturers are the main players in this supply chain, as they are the source of the 
recommended drugs. Producers manage the particular distribution of medicines from 
manufacturing facilities to drug retailers, and in some cases, straight to “retail pharmacy chains”, 
“mail-order” and “specialty pharmacies”, hospice chains. Manufacturers may also dispense 
goods directly to government clients, which naturally obtain the significant price rebates. 
Wholesale suppliers are the producers’ largest procurers. Very few drugs are dispersed directly 
to users. 
Wholesale suppliers: 
Wholesale suppliers obtaining pharmaceutical goods from manufacturers and dispense them to 
a multiplicity of consumers, as well as pharmacies (retail and mail-order), clinics, and “long term 
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care” and other “medical facilities. Some retailers sell to an extensive variety of possible clients 
while others concentrate on auctions of particular goods or deals to specific types of clienteles. 
Earlier, wholesalers restricted their actions to a traditional delivery function. They delivered the 
link between manufacturers and by warehousing products and managing inventory. While 
“traditional” distribution facilities continue the keystone of the business, the business has 
advanced a more inclusive list of services in reply to the growing marketplace. Today, retail 
distributors offer some focused services, including “specialty drug” circulation, repayment 
support, and “drug buyback” programs. 
This merging has enforced the industry to transform its revenue model, developing its core 
dispersal, business into a less margin enterprise that generates income by maximizing 
“economies of scale”, generating corporeal productivities in the distribution system, and 
recognizing monetary efficiencies. 
Pharmacies: 
These are the closing players in the supply chain over drugs reach the customer/patient. 
Pharmacies acquire medicines from retailers, and infrequently straight from manufacturers, and 
then take bodily possession of goods. After acquiring pharmaceuticals, pharmacies undertake 
the charge for their nontoxic storage and providing to customers. Pharmacies also work as a 
necessary information relation among GPOs, drug manufacturers, and wholesale suppliers. 
Unlike, other segments of the “health care delivery system” in the U.S., the pharmaceutical 
supply chain is incredibly programmed, and efficiently all dues transactions are controlled 
electronically. 
 
 
 
18 
 
3.4.1 Negotiating Contracts: 
 
According to the GPOs in our study, GPO contracting comprises of three stages: (1) issue 
"Requests for Proposals" (RFP) or requests for vendors to competitively tender for a contract, 
(2) evaluate proposals, and (3) negotiate and grant contracts. 
  
Figure 3.1: Stepwise procedure for negotiating contracts followed by GPOs 
Source: GAO analysis of GPO- reported information 
Issue RFPs:  Issuing RFPs constitutes notifying vendors, and openly posting information such 
as tender calendars, minimum qualifications for suppliers, and standards that the GPOs will 
ponder when considering bidding proposals. All GPOs have posted on their websites 
information about the minimum qualifications that vendors must meet. For instance, one GPOs 
website says that suppliers must be the primary equipment manufacturer or exhibit a particular 
marketing, link with the goods involved in the RFP, among other elements. A sample RFP 
presented by a GPO says that during the competing bidding method, it will analyze a vendor’s 
product inclinations, maintenance, and capacity to improve, as well as pricing and other 
economic factors.  Sometimes “non-bid” contracts may be granted to suppliers that present a 
proprietary, copyright (Ed) or innovative commodity; if a small group of clients requests a local 
vendor contract. 
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The primary functions here are:  
1. Notify vendors for pending requests for proposals 
2. Post bid calendars and minimum qualifications for vendors. 
Review proposals: All GPOs in our study reported considering various aspects of a supplier and 
product when evaluating proposals, including balancing financial and nonfinancial criteria, and 
then scoring bidding vendors to notify their contracting decisions. For example, one GPO 
detailed reviewing features such as a seller’s capacity to provide sufficient stock to its clients, 
quality and safety of the commodities, the source of raw supplies, and bar code readability. The 
total amount set by GPO includes product quality, upfront cost, rebates, and expected 
administrative fee income. 
Negotiate and award contracts:  All GPOs in our study stated that the majority of the 
agreements they negotiate are either "dual-source" or "multi-source," suggesting that the 
majority of the goods traded through their contracts have more than one supplier available on 
the GPOs’ contracts. The negotiation, for example, is taken as follows; a supplier might grant 
greater rebates to GPO consumers that acquire at least 80 percent of a particular group of 
goods from that producer. Loyalty requirements can also be layered, following in the opportunity 
for a client to commit to various percentages of purchasing quantity: the higher the percentage, 
the lower the cost. 
Some of the key contracting strategies followed by GPOs is mentioned below. 
Sole- Source Contracts: give one of many manufacturers of similar goods an independent right 
to sell an appropriate stock utilizing a GPO. 
Commitment: which indicates that some percentage of purchase volume met by a provider 
member, when going through a GPO, which results in higher rebates. GPO can decide these 
commitment levels or a manufacturer based on mainly two factors such as manufacturing costs 
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for that product, negotiation by GPO.  Here, the same rule follows, as higher the volume lowers 
the price. For an instance, a manufacturer provides 50% discount only for some goods when 
they purchase some 'H' quantity, and the provider member should buy the much (H) to avail that 
discount. 
Bundling: This links particular products with discounts, this contracting helps both providers and 
manufacturers, but mainly advantageous to manufacturers as they are getting more sales. For 
example, A provider member wants to purchase some quantity of medicines through GPO, so 
the GPO includes some bundling products such as patient gowns, hats, cleaning liquids, etc. to 
obtain more discounts. So here the manufacturer will obtain more benefit as it is clearing its 
inventory. And the hospital members get benefits due to less cost charged for combining 
products. 
GPOs would follow any of these contracting strategies, and this results in lessening the 
competition between the existing manufacturer and entrant manufacturer which makes the 
newcomer much harder to enter the market or can easily get them exit the market and causing 
more discouragement to the new arrivals. 
3.4.2 GPO Fund Flow Model:  
Originally devised in the 1960s, GPOs were formed as not-for-profit organizations financed 
solely by provider dues. Over time, for-profit GPOs developed, and by the 1980s, Congress 
approved GPOs to receive funding from suppliers, dispensers, and wholesalers, in addition to 
securing dues from the provider members. For GPOs, supplier payments turned out to be a far 
more productive means of funding the organization than provider based dues solely had been 
lessening the funding strain from provider members keen to see an additional reduction in 
contracting prices. 
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Figure 2.2: Payment Flow Model 
Three types of payment negotiation are done between GPO and their sponsors and vendors.    
• GPOs receive payment for the services they provide otherwise called member fees. 
(e.g.: disease management services etc.) 
• GPOs assume some performance risk in their contracts they negotiate. 
• GPOs also retain a portion of rebates they secure from vendors. 
On the provider side, GPOs are financed by a blend of hospitals and health systems, some of 
which can have notable ownership stakes, both of whom frequently pay membership dues. 
Manufacturers, distributors, and vendors also pay administrative fees, which are usually 
calculated as a portion of contract value (typically about 3%). 
Depending on the provider member's GPO contract value, owner hospitals and health systems 
can also gain returns usually equivalent to a percentage of entire fees secured (in the form of 
money or allowances). Therefore, GPOs have possibly contending incentives to not only 
achieve lower unit values for provider members but also enhance its members’ total contract 
cost with suppliers. 
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3.4.3 GPO Product Flow Model: 
 
The rebate flow happens between vendors (or manufacturers) and GPOs and from GPOs to 
hospitals. The product flow occurs between vendors to the customers or manufacturers to 
customers.  
• The rebate flow happens between vendors (or manufacturers) and GPOs and from 
GPOs to hospitals.  
• The product flow happens between vendors to the customers or manufacturers to 
customers. Third party logistics companies handle the shipping charges. 
• GPOs do not take possession of products, but in some cases, they buy products from 
specialty care and mail- order pharmacies and dispense them directly to their customers 
like a normal vendor. 
  
Figure 3.3: Product Flow 
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3.5 The Challenge Of Volume Involvements: 
 
Contradictorily, one of the biggest challenges that the big national GPOs have in acquiring lower 
costs is a result of their size. As national GPO contracts can serve a huge share of a given 
supplier’s business, many are reluctant to give their best rates to GPOs, particularly if they 
cannot make volume engagements. While GPOs negotiate contracted terms, hospitals are 
frequently not committed to obtaining at the volume levels charged in the contract. To help 
relieve these possible disincentives to pricing regulation, many GPOs have set so-called 
regional GPOs, which sums its bargaining power only within a circumstantial market or region. 
This smaller focus facilitates the local GPOs to: 
• Enforce volume involvements since they have a greater capacity to predict volume 
requirements at a regional level and regulate within a lower association of members 
• Increasingly leverage dual sourcing contracts that promote higher price contest between 
suppliers. 
3.6 Vendor Funding:  
 
Throughout the contracting process for goods and services, GPOs negotiate the installment of 
administrative fees by the seller to the GPO. In extension to utilizing these administrative fees to 
meet operating costs, GPOs may share a portion of the fees to their provider members or use 
them to fund other ventures, such as investing in other organizations. GPOs may also use 
administrative fees to subsidize supplementary services external to group purchasing for their 
clients, which can involve managing formulary, providing Fire aid services, assisting in supply 
chain metrics, benchmarking, quality assessment of the product, insurance services. 
According to the survey done by "GAO" in 2012, it is reported that administrative fees received 
from vendors estimated for about 92 percent of their income (ranging from 83% to 98%). Also, 
according to the same survey, the other sources of revenue that include membership fees, 
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licensing fees, investment in their companies and another additional revenue is shown in below 
figure. 
  
Figure 3.4: Revenue cycle for GPO 
[Source: GAO analysis of GPO- reported information] 
According to most of the critics, stated that the administrative fees which is collected by GPO is 
the main reason for high total contract costs. As if the contract costs increases, the 
administrative fees will increase which contributes the profit factor 'X' for GPOs. These critics 
argued that as the GPOs’ compensation rises as prices rise, the GPOs have a limited influence 
to negotiate lower charges, even though their consumers would profit from lower rates. Hence, 
GPOs may assign greater importance on the administrative fees and other costs than the prices 
of commodities and services for their clients.  
Some explained that provider members could change GPOs anytime if they are not satisfied 
with the rates that a GPO is negotiating. Some of the reviewers stated that hospitals change 
GPOs when they join with larger systems, but that there are notable expenses associated with 
the conversion. Notably, some asserted that GPO clients often receive pricing data from all 
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potential sources and then selectively choose goods and services they can get for the best 
prices. 
3.7 Advantages And Disadvantages Of Group Purchasing Organizations: 
 
GPOs bring benefits to its members and vendors comparatively. Vendors prefer to ensure 
business with huge customers but identify the value of attaining a significant number of minor 
consumers through one organized interface. Vendors are prepared to increase rebates and 
added service levels to the provider group to obtain a passage to their vast networks of 
customers. This enables vendors to lessen their vending cycle and beget a good progressing 
view into the market - greatly influencing stable production and supply chain management. 
While some hospital members run as nonprofit organizations and some only for-profit 
organizations - so that the discount granted by vendors is crucial to the profitability of the 
hospital members. But vendors have a confined budget for rebates and developments, so 
anything that advances into allowances to gain market through the member hospitals is no 
longer accessible for commodity rebates and other promotions that would instantly benefit the 
members being served. 
Other than volume discounts, GPOs are helping health care members by delivering primary 
services such as supply chain management; they assist the health care providers by creating an 
online domain for their procurement use. By introducing new technologies or existing 
technologies such as barcoding to manage their inventory. They also help hospital officials by 
suggesting the new medications and educating them about new equipment. They also help in 
their operations management.  
Also, to these advantages, many critics oppose GPOs, and they mentioned the following, 
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• By removing or limiting purchasing decisions from the clinicians, restricting competition, 
thereby increasing the medical costs. 
• They also raised a point on administrative fees, as GPOs are getting from the vendors 
who are used for covering their operating expenses, the contract prices are increased 
that results in the high amount of transactions. 
• GPOs allow some hospitals to utilize the purchasing power provided by GPO up to 85% 
and can leave some percent to buy out of GPO contract. Some may forbid this entire 
buying product out of GPO contract. 
• GPOs to maintain discipline among its member hospitals they follow two flow of actions, 
they are, they terminate institutions participation in that plan or withhold some incentive 
payments that are usually rebates from vendors. 
• The main issue arises from the small manufacturers who find it difficult to get their 
products in the marketplace. The GPO wants alternative products to justify the small 
purchase.  
• As the contracts are made for the longer duration (more than seven years) making the 
new vendors entering the market more problematic. 
3.8 Statistics Of Group Purchasing Organizations: 
 
1. There are roughly 600 active GPOs assisting hospital members in this country. 
2. According to Healthcare supply chain association report, 90% to 95% of the hospitals 
national wide are doing purchasing through at least one GPO. 
3. Roughly 73% of the hospital purchases are done via GPO contracts. 
4. Cost savings approximately about $864.4 billion by 2022 can be done by GPOs to health 
care members according to the Hospital Supply Chain Association report, which is done 
by Dobson DaVanzo & Associates personnel. 
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5. According to New York Times Report, Congress has examined the GPO industry 
practices, such as whether the buying process is fair or not.  
6.  A large criticism is on Administrative fee, which is collected by GPOs [roughly about 2 to 
3% of entire contract value], which is used for covering their operations and sometimes 
returning a portion of the total fees received by its hospital's members. The main 
criticism here is, to obtain more administrative fees; the GPOs are raising the total 
contracting costs, which in result increase in the prices, causing only little profits for the 
hospitals. 
According to Healthcare Purchasing News, some of the largest GPOs are mentioned below, 
basing on Annual Purchasing Volume.  [B*: Billions]  
sl no. GPO Name 2013 APV 
1 MedAssets $ 48.0 B  
2 Novation LLC $ 43.0 B  
3 Premier Inc. $ 43.0 B  
4 Health Trust Purchasing Group $ 21.2.0 B  
5 Amerinet Inc. $ 8.0 B  
6 PDM Healthcare $ 8.0 B  
7 U.S. Department of Defense $ 5.1.0 B  
8 U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs $ 5.0 B  
9 Resource Optimization & Innovation $ 817.2M  
 
Table 3.1: Annual Purchasing Volume for Top 9 GPOs  
Source: http://www.hpnonline.com/resources/GPOs.html  
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3.9 Introduction To Self-Contracting: 
 
Over the times, it appears as if medical technology firms in the U.S. have had a love-hate 
association with national group purchasing organizations (GPOs). When a vendor achieves a 
contract position with a larger GPO, there’s often a private celebration and press releases 
promoting the “victory.” At the same time, many vendors question the value GPOs give and 
bitterly criticize about the administrative fees. 
The vendors are not alone in their criticisms. Many other investors, counting the 'US Congress', 
have doubted the purpose, objectivity, and importance of GPOs. While GPOs unquestionably 
have had a prolonged and uncertain role in the healthcare supply chain, many other forces – 
such as hospital union, developing of the hospital supply chain, and transparency – are 
transforming the nature of purchasing and the prospect of buying. Some of the forces are 
mentioned below which are trending the way to self-contracting 
Hospital consolidation: Hospitals and health systems proceed to merge, create joint ventures, 
and develop across the care continuum. 
Developing of hospital supply chains: As hospitals mature in procurement abilities, expect a 
prominent focus on vendor-customer joint value formulation efforts, a reduction in many 
vendors, and a more diplomatic approach to sourcing. 
Transparency to value: Many companies are working on presenting evidence-based data on the 
price and consequences associated with many complex supply items. 
Self-contracting: Where a hospital purchases directly with the vendor, rather than buying 
through a group purchasing organization (GPO). It is accounting for an escalating proportion of 
hospital supply spend in the U.S. As hospitals merge, gain greater scale, and become qualified 
for longer-term results and prices. Many hospitals and health systems now have sufficient local 
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market potential to influence meaningfully suppliers’ local income growth and therefore serve as 
a reliable contracting alternative to GPO contracts.  
Many hospitals now have enough idea about the suppliers, their market share, etc. The 
hospitals can now move on to self-contracting (that is outside of GPO contracts). Keeping some 
physician prescribed items and some moderate prescribed items in the consideration, they have 
to follow some key steps 
• They have to opt the efficient price discovery by engaging some decision makers to 
evaluate the correct volume and price. 
• Should make contracts so that it should benefit both (the vendors and hospital) such as 
including some warehouse sharing concepts, and allowance of suppliers in critical 
discussions of inventory management and other supply chain perspective in the hospital. 
• Proper information flow should be made about the required amount of volumes of 
commodities so that vendors should be well prepared. 
3.9.1 The Inclination To Self-Contracting: 
 
One of the GPOs principal functions had been to aggregate purchasing over thousands of 
hospitals to negotiate favorable terms with vendors. The aggregation strategy worked well with 
stocks that were less differentiated, nonclinical-preference items. Although GPOs have been 
fortunate at the aggregation of specialty items, most GPOs have been less successful with 
'physician-prescribed items' (PPIs), outsourced assistances, and with the latest technologies. 
According to the report given by researchers at Wharton hospitals, in 2005, 70.6% of purchases 
are done through GPO contracts. And it is declining significantly to 55.9% in 2014. It is believed 
that the remaining percentage of purchases are done via self-contracting. This doesn’t imply 
GPOs will go off. With plentiful of supply goods to purchase, hospitals need GPOs to obtain an 
advantage in some cases – notably in commodity items. 
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Self-contracting should, however, be an essential means for hospitals to be more judicious in 
sourcing and customize contracts to meet their individual needs. It is also a moment to be more 
imperative about vendor relationships. Cooperating with select vendors has the potential to 
generate much more worth than simplistic price savings through GPO aggregation. Technology 
is a key operator of the inclination to hospital self-contracting. Although the right procurement 
supplies and facilities are critical, technology has and will accelerate the trend to self-
contracting. New resolutions are helping hospitals achieve greater perceptibility to spend, 
enhance the power and effectiveness of procurement, and better control supply expenses. For 
example, Curvo, a new start-up, has an algorithm and fuzzy logic tool to facilitate hospital 
members to cross-reference promptly supply goods, conduct analyses, and conduct bid events 
for many sections. This substitutes, many highly error-prone and indefatigable spreadsheet-
based tasks of cross-referencing and making reports.  
For vendors, this hospital tendency to self-contracting should offer both risks and opportunities. 
Some of the risks and opportunities are mentioned below. 
Relationship Management:  Providers- Vendors relations can be established along the 
continuum from transactional to collaborate to the union. Vendors with an unaware key account 
system or poor key account approach may be forced into transactional relationships, and miss 
the chance to join in collaborative value-creating connections. 
Price evaluation and Transparence: Price transparency will stimulate as technology carries out, 
spend analysis, cost comparisons, and competing for bidding events much simpler. With the 
tendency to self-contracting, there’s a risk that vendors could conclude with undisciplined and 
disordered market pricing that will be found with unique transparency means. 
Elevated Bid Frequency: If market rates are sinking for a supply level, it makes little sense for a 
provider member to stay locked into a 3 or 5-year contract. For those larger supply categories 
31 
 
under- pricing force or reaching the prime stage of the product lifecycle, at this juncture, the 
hospitals are trying to test the market and this enables self-contracting. 
Unique Business Models: Self-contracting will start up new ways to contract vendors to meet the 
individual needs of the hospital.  Self-contracting should open up more possibility to develop an 
alternative connection and business systems. 
Rethink Administration Fees: In 2012, the five largest GPOs collected approximately $2.3 Billion 
in administrative fees. One of the important arguments for the presence of GPOs is the 
efficiency generated by both hospitals and vendors in the contracting method. With the 
tendency to self-contracting, vendors should re-assess how and why they pay administrative 
fees. Many vendors have outmoded practices and techniques for giving administrative fees to 
GPOs. 
The variation in the hospital is contracting, and purchasing performance is an important trend to 
watch. For vendors, carefully piloting this change will be necessary. With over a hundred local 
buying organizations in the U.S., many developing hospital systems, and national GPOs, having 
a transparent pricing and contracting approach is a must for vendors that need to avoid margin 
decline, drained sales resources. 
Since no individual GPO addresses all the different needs of its members or its vendors, 
hospitals still try to manage their contracts with the vendors. This trend, which is advancing in 
popularity, results about 40 percent of the rate, equating to a $50 billion spend yearly. 
Historically, this contracting strategy – known as “self-contracting” or “local-contracting” – has 
been far from ideal. Hospitals and vendors tend to lack sufficient access to data or to the means 
necessary to make the right choices. Without this insight, it has been tough for hospitals to 
assess the competitiveness of proposals from supply companies, ending in rebids and a lack of 
responsibility to signing the negotiated contract. 
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The blend of a lack of commitment and poor insight into pricing turned self-contracting into a 
tiresome ordeal. Hospitals had to plan voluminous RFPs but often demanded to rebid deals due 
to the ambiguity of competitive market pricing. Retailers were also cautious about the process 
since they had trouble in understanding actual and potential market share. Such were the 
limitations of self-contracting. 
Some of the benefits of self-contracting: 
• Freedom for hospitals to choose their supplier associates and selects relevant 
performance objectives. 
• Flexibility to determine the length of the contract mutually accepted upon by both the 
hospital and the vendor. 
• Access to data on possible pricing choices and how these possibilities relate to the 
overall business. 
• Commitment, by enabling hospitals to understand the purchasing habits and practices 
that will drive to best pricing, and allow vendors to measure accurately, monitor, and 
control compliance. 
• Efficiency in handling the contract complete lifecycle, covering a streamlined pricing 
request method and ongoing implementation and performance estimation. 
All the hospital purchasing is done online in the current days. Clinicians’ decisions are now 
considered as the primary source. All the estimation of costs, cost savings are shown in the 
online portal. The characteristic negotiation graphs are also mentioned. So the hospitals can 
purchase the commodities at the level where they can achieve more rebates. Here, the 
hospitals can choose the contract period. So the contract length has been deleted. 
Some of the disadvantages of the self- contracting are, here as the hospitals are purchasing 
individually, so it is responsible for the government risk audits. It has to hold many workforces to 
33 
 
investigate regularly the prices and better optimizing the purchasing behavior. Any problems 
related to purchasing have put the burden on the hospital itself.  
3.10 Hospital Associations: 
 
Before proceeding into 'Hospital Associations', some of the advantages and disadvantages for 
manufacturers and hospitals, when the purchasing is not done through a GPO, are listed below. 
[+: Profit; - : Loss] 
1. No membership fees    (+ to hospitals) 
2. No extra services     (- to hospitals) 
3. Managing supply chain of the hospital by its own     (- to the hospital) 
4. Negotiation     (+/- to hospitals) *** 
5. No administrative fees to manufacturers    (++ to manufacturers) 
6. Limited volumes    (- to manufacturers) 
7. Limited contracts    (- to manufacturers) 
8. Length of contract (++ to hospitals) 
Bargaining power is the main issue here, basing on this the contracting efficiency depends on. 
So, according to the above-listed points, there are some disadvantages that may cause high 
lifting of prices in the purchasing department of hospitals. By including a maximum number of 
benefits when buying is done through GPO as well as including the benefits when self-
contracted, a new concept, i.e., 'Hospital Associations' is discussed in this research. 
Hospital Associations can be stated as combining the purchasing power of several hospitals 
and purchasing is done through an association, which is similar to GPO, but all the hospitals 
handle its officials. So here, there will be no membership fees, which is an added advantage for 
the hospitals. The concept of self-contracting is also involved here as the profit factor in the 
association is not there, unlike GPOs, which is similar to self-contracting. So the purchasing is 
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done directly through manufacturers. Here, the hospital association for the benefit of the 
hospitals collects the administrative fee. Clear cost equation models of hospital association are 
given in the later chapters. 
  
Figure 3.5: Hospital Association 
Some of the advantages of the Hospital Association are listed below. 
1. Collective Buying Power: Here, the purchasing volume is combined over several 
hospitals, which are members of an Association. 
2. Warehousing sharing: Sharing of warehouses is the main advantage of this ‘Hospital 
Association, which reduces the total costs of a product. 
3. Employing OFFICIAL TEAM: the members of the hospital association to manage the 
whole team. So the total cost burden on every hospital is very less as managerial costs 
are shared. 
4. Approaching for Bundled products: As the hospital members handle the association, 
there are no restrictions here, and they can approach the manufacturer for bundled 
products, which benefits the manufacturer too. 
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There are some other benefits such as physician choices for selection of products, the length of 
contracts, transportation fee, etc. 
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CHAPTER 4 – Introduction to GAME THEROY  
4.1 Introduction To Game Theory: 
“Game Theory is the formal study of conflict and cooperation. Game theoretic concepts apply 
whenever the actions of several agents are interdependent. These agents may be individuals, 
groups, firms, or any combination of these. The concept of game theory provides a language to 
formulate, structure, analyze, and understand strategic scenarios” [Ref: game theory PDF]. 
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that presents means for analyzing situations in 
which players make choices that are interdependent. This interdependence makes each player 
to consider the other player’s likely decisions, in expressing his own. The game represents the 
optimal decisions of the players, who may have comparable, contrary, or mixed interests, and 
the consequences that may emerge from these decisions. Game theory has also been 
interpreted as a study of mathematical models of dispute and cooperation between smart and 
rational decision makers. While practical use of Game Theory can be observed throughout 
history, the credit of its discovery goes to John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern.  
Important ingredients of a game: 
• Players are managerial rulers in the game; a player can be an individual, group, 
organization or population. 
• Strategies are the paths of action open to all the players in a game.
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• Payoffs are the concluding returns to players, which are commonly said in terms that are 
accurately understood by each player of the game. 
Game theory is an essential tool that helps us to get to know about the situations in which there 
is a strategic cooperation among the decision makers. Decision makers frequently encounter a 
'conflict-of-interest' situation, and each of them intends to get the best advantage out of it. This 
kind of circumstances arises in most areas. Economics is the well-known application area for 
game theory. More precisely, buyer-seller relationships, firms’ strategic decisions, government 
decisions, are some instances that can be modeled using game-theoretic tools. In addition to 
economics, so many areas like psychology, biology and many other use game theory concepts 
to analyze different situations.  
4.2 Concept Of Nash Equilibrium: 
 
Nash equilibrium is a major concept in the Game Theory and popularly used the technique of 
predicting the result of strategic interaction in the economics. A game consists of the following 
three elements:  a set of actions available to each player, a set of players, and a payoff function 
for each player. The payoff functions describe each player’s preference over work profiles, 
where a work profile is solely a program of actions, one for each player. ‘Nash equilibrium' is 
also called as “strategic equilibrium”, is a solution concept of a non-cooperative game involving 
two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the 
other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only his strategy" [Wikipedia].  
“Payoff is a number, also called the utility, that reflects the desirability of an outcome for a 
player, for whatever reason. The expected payoff incorporates the player’s attitude towards risk” 
[Turocy, 2003]. 
This theory can best be explained by looking at some examples. Consider a first game involving 
two players, each of whom has two possible actions, which are X and Y. If the players prefer 
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distinct actions, they each get a payoff of 0. If the two players choose X, they each get 2, and if 
the two players choose Y, they each get 1. This “coordination” game may be expressed as 
follows, where player 1 chooses a row, player 2 chooses a column, and the resulting payoffs are 
entered in parentheses, with the second element corresponding to player 2’s payoff. 
The action profile (Y, Y) has been equilibrium, since a one-sided deviation to A by any one 
player would end up in a lower payoff for the deviating player. Similarly, the action profile (X, X) 
is also equilibrium [Shown in below figure]. 
 
Necessary Conditions for a payoff to be Nash Equilibrium: 
Considering, the below game mentioned does not have payoff’s defined. 
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In order, for the payoff (X, X) to be a Nash equilibrium point, the following conditions must hold 
true. 
1. a > or = c 
2. b > or = f 
In order, for the payoff (X, X) to be equilibrium in dominant pure strategy, the following 
conditions must hold true. This payoff, which satisfies the conditions of Dominant Pure strategy, 
then the point is also considered as a Nash Equilibrium Point. 
1. a > c 
2. e > g 
3. b > f 
4. d > h 
Prisoners Dilemma: There are two prisoners, A & B, who have been captured by the police for 
robbing a bank. But they don't have sufficient evidence to sentence them, but know that they 
committed the crime. They put the two players in separate rooms and interrogated by laying out 
the consequences listed below: 
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• If both players confess, they will each get 5 years in prison. 
• If one player confesses and the other doesn't, the one who confessed will get 1 year in 
jail, and the other will spend 10 years in prison. 
• If neither of players confesses, they will both get 2 years for another crime they were 
wanting to. 
The payoffs are kept in a matrix,   
 
Since A's strategies are entered in rows or the x-axis, his payoffs are posted first. The B's 
payoffs are entered second since his strategies are in columns. Confess and Not confess are 
the two main conditions here. Here, the moves are simultaneous, neither player knows what the 
other player opts. At first glimpse, it may appear that both players 'not confessing' is the sound 
choice since each hostage will only get 2 years, but that is not the case by following the rules of 
game theory. 
Dominant Strategy: By viewing at each prisoner separately, we can find the dominant pure 
strategy. First looking at ‘A’, let B picks up the choice of confessing. Now the preferable choice 
for A should be selected. If A is not going to confess, then, he will get 10 years in prison, but if 
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he confesses, he will get a sentence for just 5 years. So, for A, the preferable choice is 
confessing. To show the best preferable option, the highlighted choice is kept in the matrix for a 
ready glimpse. 
 
Now let's imagine that B is not going to confess. If A confesses, he will get 1 year of prison, if he 
doesn't confess, he'll get 2 years. Again, the option of confessing is the preferable choice, no 
matter what B does. Here, confessing is dominating the choice of not confessing option in both 
the cases. By this, we can say a dominant pure strategy is followed. Highlighting the option of 
confessing here for A. 
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Similarly, checking for player B. If A opts confessing, then B should check for its preferable 
option. Here, if B chooses not to confess, he may get 10 years in prison, but if he confesses, 
then he just gets 5 years of imprisonment. Confessing is the option best suitable for player B. 
Similarly; confessing is again the best option for player B even if player A is not confessing. By 
highlighting the choices in the matrix. 
 
Here, (confess, confess) are both highlighted. Since both players have the same dominant pure 
strategy, confess, they will both confess, and each will get 5 years in prison. This payoff point is 
in Nash Equilibrium. Here, if either of player deviates from confessing to not confessing, they 
will get 10 years in jail, which is not more good than getting 5 years in prison. The payoff box 
(2,2) that results from (Not Confess, Not Confess) is NOT a Nash Equilibrium since either player 
could confess (holding the other player constant) and get 1 year in prison instead of 2 years in 
jail.
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CHAPTER 5- Development of Models 
 
For the current study, a hospital group is considered. Within that group, two hospitals are of 
interest and are taken for decision modeling. These two hospitals, called H1 and H2 here, are 
close to each other geographically, and hence have the same population as their patient base. 
They may be competing, or they may be cooperating with each other and thinking of joining the 
same hospital association. 
It is assumed that most of the hospitals in the area are purchasing through their GPOs. The 
inclination of purchasing through other sources is increasing among the hospitals. There is 
already a hospital association (HA) in the area, with 'n' members. The two hospitals H1 and H2 
have to make decisions regarding their supplies individually, whether to continue in their current 
GPOs, or to go through the hospital association, or to work directly with manufacturers. 
In the current situation, the two competing hospitals are trying to take their individual decisions 
at the same time, and keeping in view what the other hospital is going to decide. Hence the 
system is modeled as a game theory model. 
All the related decisions are taken with the single criterion of total costs of the supplies. This is 
taken as the payoff function for the models.
44 
 
Nomenclature Table: 
Sl no. Variable Definition. 
1 A Total cost for managing work-force of Hospital Association (Operating costs 
for managing an association) 
2 FM Provider’s fixed contracting cost when purchasing from the manufacturer 
3 FG H1’s Fixed contracting cost per unit + membership fees when purchasing 
from its GPO 
4 F'G H2’s Fixed contracting cost per unit + membership fees when purchasing 
from its GPO 
5 QJ Quantity required by each hospital 
6 NH Total number of hospitals planning to form a Hospital association 
7 NG Total number of members in a GPO 
8 H1 and 
H2 
Hospitals which are considered as the main players who are checking the 
best preferable option of purchasing 
9 HA Hospital Association 
10 G Group Purchasing Organization 
11 I Manufacturers 
12 xn Total price of the contract for ‘n’ member hospitals 
13 i*xn Total administrative fees collected by the hospital association from the 
manufacturers; where, i is the percentage (generally 2% to 3%) 
14 Q1 Total Quantity required by n+2 hospitals 
15 P(Q1) Price for Q1 quantity (used as price set by manufacturers in the game 
problem) 
16 Q1' Summation of Quantity of all n hospitals and either H1 or H2 (also 
represented as n+1 hospitals) 
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17 P(Q1') Price for Q1' quantity 
18 PG H1's GPO per unit on-contract price 
19 P'G H2's GPO per unit on-contract price 
20 A" Total manufacturing costs for a product 
21 B Minimum Possible costs 
22 C Varying Per unit costs with respective to volume 
23 Z Ware housing and transportation costs per hospital 
24 H Holding costs per unit per year 
25 S Ordering costs per order 
26 q Optimal order quantity 
      
Sl no. Symbol
s 
Cost functions 
1 π1 Total costs of the supplies when both H1 and H2 joins the association and 
purchasing through the association: (n+2 members) 
2 π2 Total costs of the supplies when H1 or H2 join the association formed by 'n' 
hospitals and do the purchasing through it: (n+1 members) 
3 π3 Total costs bared by H1 when it is purchasing its required quantity through its 
GPO 
4 π4 Total costs bared by H2 when it is purchasing its required quantity through its 
GPO 
5 π1' Total costs, when Hospitals H1 and H2 form an association and do the 
purchasing  
6 π2' Total costs bared by either H1 or H2 do the purchasing directly through 
manufacturers 
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7 π3' Same as π3 
8 π4' Same as π4 
9 π5 Same as π1 
10 π6 Same as π2 
11 π7 Total costs, when H1 is purchasing directly from the manufacturer 
12 π8 Total costs, when H2 is purchasing directly from the manufacturer 
13 π5' Same as π1' 
14 π6' Same as π2' 
15 π7' Same as π7 
16 π8' Same as π8 
Table 5.1: Nomenclature Table 
 
ASSUMPTIONS: 
1. The n hospitals have not yet decided to continue purchasing through the group. They 
are waiting for the two hospitals H1 and H2 to join their group so that they can get more 
discounts than expected.  
2. The hospitals H1 and H2 are trying to decide whether to proceed in Hospital Association 
(HA) or purchasing through GPOs (GP) or purchasing directly from manufacturers (I). All 
the variables and assumptions are mentioned in the nomenclature table. 
3. It is assumed that the quantity required is same for all hospitals, including H1 and H2, 
QJ. 
4. The fixed contracting cost of the manufacturers is more than the fixed contracting cost of 
the GPO. That is FM > FG, as the two hospitals have different GPOs, and considering 
that FG’ < FG; and similarly considering different manufacturers F”M≤ FM’≤ FM [where, F”M 
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is the fixed contracting cost when purchasing through HA, and the remaining two are for 
hospitals H2 and H1 respectively.] 
 
Scenario: Two hospitals (H1 and H2) are checking whether they can buy their supplies from 
their current registered GPOs (GP), or joining the single Hospital Association (HA) and buying 
from it, or purchasing directly from the manufacturers (I).  
In this scenario, two cases are considered, depending on the values NG and NH, the sizes of the 
GPOs and association respectively, before they join it. 
Three types of analysis are proposed in this research.  
First is finding the preferable choice of purchasing in each of the case of scenario, with known 
costs. 
Second one is proposing lemmas for each of the payoff, establishing conditions for a payoff to 
be a Nash Equilibrium point. 
Lastly, finding the optimal total costs for each of the situations, and deriving the low cost option 
of purchasing for the hospital. 
5.1.1 Case of Both GPOs and HA having n Members Each 
 
Here, NG = NH=n, that is there are 'n' member hospitals in each GPO and in the HA.  
The formulation of cost equations is done based on several factors. When both hospitals H1 
and H2 join the HA, there will be (n+2) hospitals in the HA.  
If a hospital joins the HA, the following costs need to be considered: 
Administrative fees, managerial costs, product costs (price set by manufacturers), contracting 
costs (set by manufacturers), and holding and transportation costs.  
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Then for each of the two hospitals, in case of both joining HA, 
• The managerial costs required for Hospital Association = [A/(n+2)] 
• The fixed contracting costs when purchasing from manufacturer = [F”M / (n+2)] 
• Product costs = [P(Q1)*Q1/(n+2)] 
The price per unit quantity, P(Q1), is a function of Q1, the total quantity purchased by HA, which 
is equal to QJ*(n+2).  
• Administrative fee collected by the HA = [(i*(xn+2)/(n+2)] 
The Hospital Association collects the administrative fee i*xn+2, from manufacturers, which is a 
percentage of total contract value xn+2.  
Thus the total cost equation formulated here is represented as π1, which is given by 
  π1 = Z + [A + F”M + P(Q1)*Q1 – i(xn+2)]/(n+2)       (5.1) 
Similarly, when only one of the hospitals of H1 and H2 joins the HA, then there will be (n+1) 
members in the HA. The total quantity purchased by HA is given by Q1’ which is equal to QJ* 
(n+1). The total costs for the single hospital, which joins the HA would be 
    π2 = Z + [A + F”M + P(Q1’)*Q1’ – i(xn+1)]/(n+1)                      (5.2) 
If the two hospitals remain in their respective GPOs, the related costs would include 
Membership fees, Product costs (price set by GPO) and holding and transportation costs. 
The other hospital, in this case, is purchasing through its registered GPO. The costs involved 
here, are the membership fee, which is collected by the GPO from the hospital, and is 
represented as FG and the price per unit set by the GPO depends on the total number of 
quantities from its ‘n’ members, which is represented as PG(Qn). The total amount which is paid 
to the GPO by the hospital is given by PG (Qn) *QJ. [Since QJ is the quantity required by a 
hospital]. The total cost equations are given by,  
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π3: Z + F’G + P’G(Qn)*Qn/n                                  (5.3) 
π4: Z + FG + PG(Qn)*QJ/n                          (5.4) 
If the two hospitals purchase directly from the manufacturers, the related costs would be 
contracting costs (set by the manufacturer), product costs (price set by manufacturer) and 
holding and transportation costs. 
The price per unit set by the manufacturer = P(QJ) 
The total costs which is given to the manufacturer by the hospital is given by P(QJ)QJ. [Since, QJ 
is the quantity required by a hospital]. The total cost equations are given by,  
Π5: Z + F’M + P’(QJ)QJ                        (5.5) 
Π6: Z + FM + P(QJ)QJ                          (5.6) 
The corresponding payoff matrix and the payoff equations π1, π2, π3, π4, π5, π6 are given in 
the figure 5.1 
 
Figure 5.1 Matrix and Pay-off Functions for Case 5.1.1 
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5.1.1.1 Solution for Case 5.1.1, with Known Costs: 
 
The concept of “Best Response” in the game theory is used as a principle procedure to find out 
if there exists a Nash Equilibrium Point (solution), for the above payoff matrix. The procedure is 
mentioned below:  
1. Firstly, it is taken that H2 has chosen to go through the HA. Then, the H1 has the option of 
going through the HA, in which case its total cost would be Π1, or continue to go through its 
GPO, at a total cost of Π4, or purchasing directly from the manufacturers, at a total cost of 
Π6.  
1.1. The cost equations in comparison here are (5.1), (5.4), and (5.6).  
Π1 = Z + [A + F”M + P(Q1)*Q1 – i*(xn+2)]/(n+2) 
Π4 = Z + FG + PG(Qn)*QJ 
Π6: Z + FM + P(QJ)QJ 
In general, PG(Qn)*QJ depends on upon the fixed contracting cost of manufacturers as 
well as price set by the manufacturers. A GPO ‘marks up’ this price by a profit factor of 
‘X’, which is generally 1% to 2% of the total monetary value set by the manufacturer to 
obtain more income. In such a case, 
Π4 can be written as (FM + PM(Qn)*QJ + X) + FG+Z.                       
Comparing the equations,  
As cited in the assumptions, the contracting costs set by the manufacturer when 
purchased through HA is F”M which is less than the contracting costs when purchased 
through GPOs, i.e., FM.  
F”M < FM. 
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Comparing the product costs, there is an extra profit factor ‘X’ and membership fees ‘FG’ 
when purchased through GPOs which increases the total costs. These costs are not 
incurred when the purchasing is done through the HA, allowing for savings. Considering 
the rule, the higher the quantity, the lower the price per unit, higher the discounts, the 
quantity, when purchased directly from the manufacturers, would be less than the 
aggregated quantity when purchased from the other two alternatives. Therefore, the 
comparative relationship is given as, 
P(QJ)QJ >PM(Qn*QJ + X) + FG >  P(Q1)*Q1 
The managerial costs for HA, i.e., ‘A’ are totally covered by the administrative fees 
collected from the manufacturers by the HA. All the hospital members in HA share the 
remaining administrative fee. This shows that π1 has lower costs for purchasing in 
comparison to π4, π6 and thus π1 < π4< π6. Keeping ‘*’ beside π1 in the game matrix 
to prove its dominance. 
2. Likewise, if it is assumed that H2 is purchasing through its GPO, the hospital H1 now has 
the choice of purchasing through HA or purchasing via GPO or purchasing directly from the 
manufacturers. 
2.1. The equations for comparison here are π2, π4, and π6. 
Π2 = Z + [A + F”M + P(Q1’)*Q1’ – i*(xn+1)]/(n+1) 
Π4 = Z + FG + PG(Qn)*QJ 
Π6 = Z + FM + P(QJ)QJ 
Following the explanation given to the previous case, purchasing via Hospital 
Association is the preferable option for H1, i.e., Π2 < Π4 < Π6, since the addition of 
membership fees and the profit factor X in the price which is set by the GPO [PG(Qn)] is 
more than the price when purchased via Hospital Association (HA).  The quantity versus 
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price rule is followed as mentioned above. Therefore, Π2 has dominance here in this 
comparison. 
3. If H1 choses the purchasing option of HA, then H2 should choose between the Hospital 
Association and GPO and purchasing directly from manufacturers (I). 
3.1. The cost equations would be π1, π3 and π5. 
Π1 = Z + [A + F”M + P(Q1)*Q1 – i*(xn+2)]/(n+2) 
Π3 = Z + F’G + P’G(Qn)*QJ 
Π5 = Z + F’M + P’(QJ)QJ 
Following similar logic as given before; Π1< π3<π5. Hence the preferable option for H2 
is purchasing through HA [Dominant strategy here is HA, i.e., for costs Π1]. 
4. Similarly, fixing the choice for H1 as GPO, the hospital H2 can choose between HA, GPO, 
and I. The cost equations here for comparison are  
4.1. Π2 = Z + [A + F”M + P(Q1’)*Q1’ – i*(xn+1)]/(n+1). 
Π3 = Z + F’G + P’G(Qn)*QJ 
Π5 = Z + F’M + P’(QJ)QJ 
By following the above-mentioned explanation it can be shown that, Π2 < Π3 < Π5. 
Therefore, the preferable option of purchasing for H2 is through the HA. 
5. When H1 chooses to purchase directly from the manufacturers, then H2 can make a choice 
between purchasing through GPO, purchasing via Hospital Association, and buying directly 
from the manufacturers. By following the same methodology mentioned above, purchasing 
via Hospital Association is a low-cost strategy when compared to other choices of 
purchasing. (HA: Dominant strategy). 
The dominance matrix is shown in figure 5.2. Here, the payoff [HA,HA] satisfies the best 
response point. 
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Figure 5.2: Dominance Matrix for payoff functions for Case 5.1.1 
The conditions for a payoff to be Nash equilibrium are listed in Chapter 4. Here, the best 
response point [HA, HA] to be Nash equilibrium point, it should satisfy the conditions of 
dominant pure strategy. Here, the payoff is [Π1, Π1], the low-cost option is chosen as a 
preferable option. 
Π1 < Π4< Π6 
Π1 < Π3< Π5 
Π2 < Π4< Π6 
Π2 < Π3< Π5 
This point is satisfying all the conditions of dominant pure strategy. Therefore, [Π1, Π1] is the 
Nash equilibrium point and the best strategy point for hospital H1 and H2. 
5.1.1.2 Pay-Off Conditions for the existence of Nash Equilibrium 
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In section 5.1.1.1 certain assumptions were made regarding the cost structures and the 
resultant payoff functions were shown to have a Nash-Equilibrium point. In this section, the 
opposite path is taken, that is, it is assumed that the solution has a Nash-Equilibrium, and the 
related cost conditions for this equilibrium are derived from the four different combinations.  
Assumptions: It is assumed that each of the two GPO has ‘N’ members, and the HA has 'n' 
members before the two hospitals make their decisions. 
Lemma 1.1: It is assumed [HA, HA] to be a Nash Equilibrium point, which means both hospitals 
[H1 and H2] are choosing the purchasing option of going through the hospital association. Here 
the payoffs are [Π1, Π1]. The conditions below are derived as, 
Π1 should be less than or equal to Π4 and Π4 should be less than or equal to Π6. The total cost 
equations are written below and are to be related to get one of the conditions, and Π1 should be 
less than or equal to Π3 which is less than or equal to Π5 to get the other condition.  
Π1 ≤ Π4 ≤ Π6; 
    Z + [A + FM + P(Q1)*Q1 – i*(xn+2)]/(n+2) ≤ Z + FG + PG(QN)*QJ ≤ Z + FM + P(QJ)QJ 
Here, i*(xn+2) is the administrative fees collected by the Hospital Association from the 
manufacturer, and it is generally 2% to 3% of the entire contract value. This term can be 
replaced by, i* [FM + P(Q1)*(QJ)*(n+2)]. On the RHS of the equation, FG is the membership fees 
collected by the GPO from the member hospitals. It is generally about 1% to 2% of the entire 
contract value. This term can be replaced by i”*( PG(QN)*QJ). Here, the contract cost, when 
purchased through the GPO, is denoted by PG(QN)*QJ, which depends on the fixed 
manufacturing cost set by the manufacturer (FM), the price set by the manufacturer for the 
Quantity for N members which is denoted by P(QN), and the profit factor “X” which is usually 1% 
to 2% of the total contract cost. So the term PG(QN)*QJ can be replaced by [FM + P(QN)*QJ + X]. 
Therefore, the equation can be written with replaced forms as shown below, 
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    Z + [A + FM + [P(Q1)*QJ*(n+2)] – i* [FM + P(Q1)*(QJ)*(n+2)] ]/(n+2) ≤ Z + i”*( [FM + P(QN)*QJ + 
X ]) + [FM + P(QN)*QJ + X] ≤ Z + FM + P(QJ)QJ 
By solving the above equation, (assuming i” = i) 
[(A + (FM)(1-i))/ [[(i+1)(FM(QJ+1) + QJ* X)] + [QJ*((i+1)* P(QN))  – [(1-i)*( P(Q1))]]] – 2 ≤ n.     (5.7) 
[(A + (FM)(1-i))/[( FM+(QJ*[P(QJ) -(1-i)*( P(Q1))]))]] – 2≤ n     (5.8) 
[(i* FM)/[P(QJ) -  (i+1)*[(P(QN)+X]]] ≤ QJ        (5.9) 
According to the quantity discount contract, the price per unit decreases when the quantity 
increases, which is shown in figure 5.3. [Where, P: Price; B: Minimum profit price]. The 
discounted price cannot go below the minimum profit price (B). 
 
 
From the above graph it can be stated that, as volume increases, the price per unit decreases. 
The Volume versus Price curve can be expressed as an equation, which is given as,  
P(Q) = B + (P* (𝑒!(!∗!))  
Here, s: the number of members and Q: the Quantity required by an individual hospital. 
Figure 5.3: Volume versus Price curve 
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The terms P(Q1) and P(QN) can be replaced in the form of above stated equation.  This results 
in, 
ð P(Q1) = B + (P* (𝑒!((!!!)∗!"))       (5.10) 
ð P(QN) = B + (P* (𝑒!(!∗!"))        (5.11)  
ð P(QJ) = B + (P* (𝑒!(!"))        (5.12) 
By substituting the equations eq. (5.10), eq. (5.11), and eq. (5.12) in the equations eq. (5.7), 
(5.8), (5.9);   
ð [(A + (FM)(1-i))/ [[(i+1)(FM(QJ+1) + QJ* X)] + QJ* [2iB + i*P*(𝑒!((!!!!!)∗!") + 
P*[𝑒!(!∗!")– 𝑒!((!!!)∗!") ]] –2≤ n                (5.13) 
ð [(A + (FM)(1-i))/[( FM+(QJ*[ B + (P* (𝑒!(!")) - (1-i)* B + (P* (𝑒!((!!!)∗!")))]))]] – 2≤ n    
(5.14) 
ð [(i* FM)/[ [ B + (P* (𝑒!(!")) -  (i+1)*[( B + (P* (𝑒!((!!!)∗!")) +X]]] ≤ QJ  (5.15) 
ð  These three conditions are to be followed in order the payoffs [Π1, Π1] to be in Nash 
equilibrium (Π1 < Π4< Π6). The other conditions are same but the terms differ, because 
the cost equation Π3 denotes a different GPO through which H2 purchases [Π1 ≤ Π3]. 
The final conditions are  
ð [(A + (FM)(1-i))/ [[(i+1)(FM(QJ+1) + QJ* X’)] + QJ* [2iB + i*P*(𝑒!((!!!!!)∗!") + 
P*[𝑒!(!∗!")– 𝑒!((!!!)∗!") ]] –2≤ n      (5.16) 
ð [(A + (FM)(1-i))/[( FM+(QJ*[ B + (P* (𝑒!(!")) - (1-i)* B + (P* (𝑒!((!!!)∗!")))]))]] – 2≤ n 
(5.17) 
ð [(i* FM)/[ [ B + (P* (𝑒!(!")) -  (i+1)*[( B + (P* (𝑒!((!!!)∗!")) +X’]]] ≤ QJ    (5.18) 
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ð  In this equation the profit factor X’ and the percentage of membership fees i’ are 
different from the equation eq. (5.9). But assuming i’ = i the resulting condition is derived. 
In order to be a best response point [Nash equilibrium point] the payoff [Π1, Π1] should 
satisfy all these six conditions. 
ð From the lemmas, the conditions for a payoff to be a Nash equilibrium point are derived. 
These lemmas can be extended to other cases too. The conditions for 'n' (number of 
members in HA) are derived from these lemmas. When the value of 'n' (number of 
members in HA) reaches or exceeds the value of 'N' (number of members in GPO), then 
purchasing via HA attains more profits for the hospitals H1 and H2. But in general, the 
number of members in HA is less than the number of members in GPO [i.e., n<N].  
5.1.1.3 Numerical Example 
 
The situation is illustrated by a numerical example, with all the relevant numbers chosen 
hypothetically. In most of the cases, the number of members in GPO is more than the number of 
members in Hospital Association. Therefore, it is assumed there are 15 members in the hospital 
association and 30 members in GPO [including H1 and H2]. The quantity required is same for 
each hospital, that is QJ =120,000 units. 
The Fixed manufacturing costs FM are basically the fixed manufacturer overhead costs, FM = 
$15,000  
Managerial costs for HA = A = $1,100,000 
The percentage of administrative fees collected from the manufacturers by the Hospital 
Association is = i = 2% 
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Membership fee is collected by the GPOs from hospitals generally 1% to 2% of the entire 
contract value. It is assumed that membership fee for the GPO paid by the hospital H2 is 2% of 
the entire contract value and 1% for the GPO paid by the hospital H1. 
The profit factor ‘X’ which is gained by GPO is about 1% to 2% of the total contract costs set by 
the manufacturer. Keeping X = 1%(total costs) for the GPO through which the hospital H1 is 
purchasing, and 2% (total costs) for the other GPO, 
The base price or the minimum profit price is B = $150 / unit. 
The selling price when purchased only one unit P = $700/unit. 
Following the price per unit versus quantity curve [Fig. 5.3], the resulting is, 
P(Q) = B + P*(e –(QJ *n’’)).  If Q tends to infinity the price per unit will come closer to B.  
Now, Assuming holding costs are same for each hospital, and hence ignoring the holding costs, 
and calculating the price per unit when purchased through HA, when both hospitals are 
purchasing through HA. i.e., π1. 
P(15) = 150 + 700*( e –(0.12*15)) = $265 / unit.       (Quantity in millions) 
π1 = [A + F”M + P(Q1)Q1 – i*(xn+2)]/(n+2) = [[1100000+15000(.98)]/15] + [0.98(265(120000))] = 
$31238313.3 = $31.23 millions. 
Similarly π2 = [A + F”M + P(Q1)Q1 – i*(xn+1)]/(n+1)]. Only one hospital joins the HA and other 
purchases through GPO. Therefore there are 14 members in HA. 
 P(14) = 150 + 700*( e –(0.12*14)) = $280 / unit.        
Calculating for π2, we get = $33002313.3 = $33.0 millions. 
Now calculating price per unit when the hospitals H2 and H1 purchase through their respective 
GPOs i.e., π3 and π4. 
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P(QN) = B + P*(e –(QJ *N)) 
As mentioned in the above lemmas, we can replace the term P(QN)QJ with [F”M+P(QN)(QJ)+X],  
P(QN) = 150 + 700 * (e –(.12*30)) = $170 /unit. 
Now π3 = F’G+ P(QN)QJ 
π3 = 1.02(15000 + 170 (120000) + .02(15000 + 170*(120000))) = $21239766 = $21.2 millions. 
Similarly, π4 is calculated, which is = FG+ P(QN)QJ, by changing the values as mentioned in the 
start of the problem. 
The resulting value for π4 = 1.01 (15000 + 170 (120000) + .01(15000 + 170*(120000))) = 
$20825341.5 = $20.8 millions. 
The payoffs π5 and π6 are computed, when H1 and H2 purchase individually from the 
manufacturers.  
From the Volume versus Price curve (Fig. 5.3), [since, N=1]  
ð P(Q) = B + P*(e –(QJ)) 
ð P(Q) = 150 + 700 * (e –(.12)) = $770.84 /Unit. 
Calculating the payoff π5 which is equal to π6,  
π5 = π6 = F’M + P’(QJ)QJ = 15000 + 770.84(120000) = $92.5 millions. 
Now the payoffs are calculated. The payoff matrix, with the payoffs given in millions of dollars, is 
given, for case 5.1.1 game, in figure 5.4 
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Figure 5.4: Payoff Matrix 
Here, by following the best response procedure, the optimal or preferable point or the Nash 
equilibrium point is [GP,GP] and the payoffs are [20.8,21.2] for H1 and H2. This shows that, in 
general cases, the low cost option is purchasing via GPOs than purchasing via HA and 
purchasing individually from the manufacturers. The lemmas and the numerical examples can 
be done for all the other cases.  
5.1.2 Case when there are no members in HA 
 
Here, NG = n and NH= 0, that is there are 'n' member hospitals in each GPO, and there are no 
members in HA.  
Here, the formulation of cost equations is done based on several factors.  When both hospitals 
H1 and H2 merges (M) and work like a Hospital Association (HA), there will be just two hospitals 
in the HA.  
If a hospital accepts to merge with another hospital, the following costs need to be weighed: 
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Administrative fees, managerial costs, product costs (price set by manufacturers), contracting 
costs (set by manufacturers), and holding and transportation costs. Then for each of the two 
hospitals, in case of both are merged (M), 
• The managerial costs = [A/2] 
• The fixed contracting costs when purchased from manufacturer = [F”M / 2] 
• Product costs = [(P(2QJ)*2QJ)/(2)] 
The price per unit quantity, P(2QJ), is a function of 2QJ, the total quantity purchased by the two 
hospitals, which is equal to QJ*2.  
• Administrative fee collected by the hospitals when they are merged (M) = [(i*(x2)/2] 
Hence the total cost equation formulated here is represented as π1’, which is given by 
  π1’ = Z + [A + F”M + (P(2QJ)*QJ) – i*(x2)]/(2)                          (5.19) 
When one of the hospitals is purchasing through its registered GPO, there will be no merging of 
hospitals. In this instance, the other hospital would purchase directly from the manufacturer (I). 
The following costs need to be looked at: 
Fixed contracting costs (set by the manufacturer), product costs (price set by the manufacturer), 
and the holding and transportation costs. 
The total cost for the hospital would be π2’ = Z + F”M + P(QJ)*QJ                  (5.20)  
If the two hospitals remain in their respective GPOs, the related costs would be: 
Membership fees, Product costs (price set by GPO) and holding and transportation costs. 
The costs involved here are the membership fee collected by the GPO from the hospital, which 
is denoted as FG, and the price per unit set by the GPO depends on the total number of 
quantities from its ‘n’ members, which is represented as PG(Qn). The total amount which is paid 
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to the GPO by the hospital is given by PG(Qn)QJ. [Since QJ is the quantity required by a 
hospital]. The total cost equations are given by,  
π3: Z + F’G + P’G(Qn)*Qn/n                        (5.21) 
π4: Z + FG + PG(Qn)*Qn/n                          (5.22) 
If the two hospitals purchase directly from the manufacturers, the related costs would be: 
Contracting costs (set by the manufacturer), product costs (price set by manufacturer) and 
holding and transportation costs. 
The price per unit set by the manufacturer = P(QJ) 
The total costs paid to the manufacturer by the hospital is given by P(QJ)*QJ. [Since, QJ is the 
quantity required by a hospital]. The total cost equations are given by,  
Π5: Z + F’M + P’(QJ)*QJ                        (5.5) 
Π6: Z + FM + P(QJ)*QJ                          (5.6) 
The corresponding payoff matrix and the payoff equations π1’, π2’, π3, π4, π5, π6 are given in 
the figure 5.5 
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Figure 5.5: Matrix and Pay-off Functions for case 5.1.2 
5.1.2.1 Solution for Case 5.1.2, with Known Costs: 
 
The concept of “Best Response” in the game theory is employed as a principle procedure to find 
out if there exists a Nash Equilibrium Point (solution), for the above payoff matrix. The 
procedure is mentioned below.  
1. If H2 chooses to purchase by merging with the H1, now, H1 should choose from merging 
with H2, purchasing via GPO, and purchasing directly from manufacturers. 
1.1. The payoffs here in comparison are, 
Π1’ = Z + [A + F”M + P(2QJ)*2QJ – i*(x2)]/2 
Π4 = Z + FG + PG(Qn)*QJ 
Π6: Z + FM + P(QJ)*QJ 
The comparison is performed between the prices P(2QJ)*2QJ ,PG(Qn)*QJ and P(QJ)QJ. As 
mentioned in assumptions, price is inversely proportional to the quantity, the total cost is 
PG(Qn)QJ, and even it has the profit factor X resulting in lesser value than P(2QJ)2QJ, i.e., 
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PG(Qn)*QJ < P(2QJ)*2QJ < P(QJ)QJ [since Qn > 2QJ> QJ], As a result, purchasing via GPO is 
chosen as the preferable option for H1 [Dominant strategy: GPO]. 
2. If H2 choose to purchase through GPO, then as there are no hospitals to merge, H1 should 
choose between purchasing directly from manufacturers (with fixed contracting cost as FM’’), 
GPO, and purchasing directly from manufacturers (FM). The equations are given below. 
2.1. The cost equations are π2’, π4 and Π6. 
Π2’ = Z + F”M + P(QJ)*QJ 
Π4 = Z + FG + PG(Qn)*QJ 
Π6: Z + FM + P(QJ)*QJ 
The cost here is less when purchased via GPO as the combined volume, is higher (Qn) than 
QJ and as per the rule: volume is inversely proportional to the cost is verified. So the option 
of purchasing through GPO is preferable than purchasing directly from manufacturers 
[Dominant strategy: GPO]. 
3. If H2 chooses to buy its supplies directly from the manufacturer, then H1 can choose among 
purchasing via HA, purchasing through its GPO and purchasing directly from the 
manufacturer.  
3.1. The payoff equations compared are, 
Π2’ = Z + F”M + P(QJ)*QJ 
Π4 = Z + FG + PG(Qn)*QJ 
Π6: Z + FM + P(QJ)*QJ 
Similar to the above explanation, purchasing through GPO is preferable option than 
purchasing through other two alternatives. 
4. Checking for the low-cost choice of purchasing for H2, when H1 chooses to purchase by 
merging with H2.     
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4.1. The payoff equations are π1’,π3 and Π5. 
Π1’ = Z + [A + F”M + P(2QJ)*2QJ – i*(x2)]/ (2) 
Π3’ = Z + F’G + P’G(Qn)*QJ 
Π5 = Z + F’M + P’(QJ)QJ 
By adopting the procedure stated above, Π3’ is opted as the preferable choice of purchasing 
for H2. As, Π3’< Π1’ < Π5 so H2 choosing the option of purchasing through its GPO than the 
other two choices. [Dominant strategy: GPO] 
5. The preferable choice for H2 is purchasing via GPO when H1 opts purchasing through its 
GPO. The cost equations compared in this instance are Π2’, Π3 and Π5. The outcome 
obtained is Π3 < Π2’< Π5 [Dominant strategy: GPO]. Same outcome is resulted when H1 
chooses to purchase its supplies directly from the manufacturers. 
The final dominance matrix here is shown in figure 5.6. Here, the payoff [GP, GP] is the best 
response point. 
 
Figure 5.6: Dominance Matrix for payoff functions for Case 5.1.2 
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The conditions for a payoff to be Nash equilibrium are listed in Chapter 4. Here, the best 
response point [GP, GP] to be a Nash equilibrium point should satisfy the conditions of 
dominant pure strategy. The payoff is [Π4, Π3], is chosen as the low-cost option of purchasing 
for H1 and H2 respectively. 
Π4 < Π2’< Π6 
Π3 < Π2’< Π5 
Π4 < Π1’< Π6 
Π3 < Π1’< Π5 
This point is satisfying all the conditions of dominant pure strategy. Therefore, [Π4, Π3] is the 
Nash equilibrium point and the best strategy point for both hospitals H1 and H2. 
5.3 Optimizing the order quantity:  
So far, the total purchase costs have been considered without any consideration of order 
quantities and any determination of optimal quantities. In this section, optimal quantities and 
optimal total costs are taken up. The Optimal order quantity is determined in order to cut down 
the total costs. The concept of Economic Order quantity is used. The minimization of total 
costs is done for both the cases. The main rule followed here is: As the number of orders 
increases, the ordering costs increase and inventory (holding) costs decrease. 
It is assumed the cost per order: S1< S2 < S3  
Scenario:  Two hospitals (H1 and H2) are checking whether they can buy their supplies from 
their current registered GPOs (GP), or joining the single Hospital Association (HA) and buying 
from it, or purchasing directly from the manufacturers (I).  
Case 1.1: When NG=NH=n, the game model is given in the below figure; 
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The total cost equation generally can be written as, 
Total Cost = Purchasing cost + ordering cost + Holding Cost 
Considering, both Hospitals are going through HA, i.e.,  
π1 = Z + [A + F”M + P(Q1)*Q1 – i(xn+2)]/(n+2) 
The purchasing costs generally consist of fixed contracting costs (set by the manufacturers), 
product costs (price set by the manufacturers) and the managerial costs ‘A’.  
Purchasing costs for π1 = A+F”M+P(Q1)*Q1]/(n+2)    (5.23) 
Ordering cost equation generally consists of, demand for each hospital (D), order size 
(q), and ordering costs (S).  
 The demand for each hospital in case of π1 = Q1/n+2  
The number of orders = D/q = Q1/(q*(n+2)), 
Assuming ordering costs per order for π1 is S1 
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Total ordering costs for π1 = the number of orders * annual ordering costs  
= [[Q1/q(n+2)]*S1]         (5.24) 
Holding costs for π1 depends on average inventory level, which is determined by order 
size by 2 = q/2 
Annual per unit holding costs = H 
Annual holding cost is calculated by  
= [(q/2)*H*P(Q1)]          (5.25) 
The total cost equation for π1 can be written as (summation of purchasing costs, 
ordering and holding costs) 
Total Cost (TC) for π1 = [[A+F”M+P(Q1)*Q1]/(n+2)] + [[Q1/q(n+2)]*S1] + [(q/2)*H*P(Q1)] 
           (5.26)  
Here, optimizing the order quantity q: 
The optimal order quantity is obtained at the point when the total cost is minimum. 
Hence, minimizing the total costs, 
!"#!" = 0  
=  0 – [Q1*S1/(n+2)]*[1/q^2] + + [[H*P(Q1)]/2] 
That results as, optimal order quantity q* = sqrt ([2*Q1*S1]/[(n+2)* H*P(Q1)])       (5.27) 
Substituting the value of q* in equation (5.26) 
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TC for π1 = [[A+F”M+P(Q1)Q1]/(n+2)] + [[Q1/(n+2) * sqrt 
([2*Q1*S1]/[(n+2)*H*P(Q1)])]*S1] + [(sqrt ([2*Q1*S1]/[(n+2)*H*P(Q1)]) * H * P(Q1)/2] – 
[i(xn+2)/(n+2)] 
The optimal value of the total costs is obtained for π1, which is represented as π1opt. 
π1opt. = [(A+F”M+P(Q1)*Q1) - i(xn+2)/(n+2)] + 2 [sqrt(Q1 * S1 * H * P(Q1)/(2*(n+2))] (5.28) 
The optimal total costs for π2 can be done in similar approach. The equation π2 can be 
written as below, 
π2 = Z + [A + F”M + P(Q1’)*Q1’ – i(xn+1)]/(n+1) 
The Purchasing costs for π2 = A+F”M+P(Q1’)*Q1’]/(n+1) 
Ordering costs = [[Q1/q(n+1)]*S1] Here, annual ordering costs is S1  
Holding costs for π2 = [(q/2)*H*P(Q1)] 
The total costs = A+F”M+P(Q1’)Q1’]/(n+1) + [[Q1/q(n+1)]*S1] + [(q/2)*H*P(Q1)]   (5.29) 
The optimal order quantity q* = sqrt ([2*Q1’*S1]/[(n+1)* H*P(Q1’)])          (5.30) 
By substituting the equation (5.30) in eq. (5.29), the optimal total costs for Π2 is 
obtained and it is represented as Π2opt. 
Π2 opt. = [(A+F”M+P(Q1’)*Q1’) - i(xn+1)/(n+1)] + 2 [sqrt(Q1’ * S1 * H * P(Q1’)/(2*(n+1))]   
           (5.31) 
Now, calculating the optimal costs for the equation for π3, when H2 purchases through 
its registered GPO (GP) i.e., Π3 = Z + F’G + P’G(Qn)*QJ 
The total cost can be expressed as, 
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Total Cost = Purchasing cost + Ordering Cost + Holding Cost 
The purchasing costs for Π3 comprises of product costs (P’G(Qn)*QJ) and membership 
fees collected from hospitals (F’G). Hence,  
Purchasing costs = [FG’ + PG’(Qn)*QJ] 
Ordering costs = [(QJ * S2/q)] (S2: cost per order) 
Holding costs = [(q/2) * H * PG’(Qn)] (H: per unit holding cost) 
The total cost equation is written below, 
TC = [FG’ + PG’(Qn)*QJ] + [(q/2) * H * PG’(Qn)] + [(QJ * S2/q)]       (5.32) 
Finding the optimal order quantity which is determined by minimizing the total costs 
equation, 
𝜕TC𝜕𝑞 = 0 
This results in q* = sqrt[(2* QJ * S2)/(H * PG’(Qn))]                (5.33) 
Substituting this value in eq. (5.32), the optimal total costs for Π3 is obtained and is 
given by 
Π3 opt. = [FG’ + PG’(Qn)*QJ] + [2 * sqrt [(PG’(Qn) * QJ * H * S2)/2]]     (5.34) 
Similarly, deriving the optimal total costs equation for Π4 
Π4 opt. = FG + PG(Qn)*QJ] + [2 * sqrt [(PG(Qn) * QJ * H * S3)/2]]      (5.35) 
Now for Π5opt. , which is the total optimal cost when hospital H2 is purchasing directly 
from manufacturer, 
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Π5 = Z + F’M + P’(QJ)QJ 
The purchasing costs for Π5 comprises of fixed contracting costs set by the manufacturer 
and the price set by the manufacturer = F’M+P(QJ)*QJ 
The ordering costs = (QJ/q)*S2 (here, the cost per order is assumed as S2) 
The holding costs per unit are assumed to be same for all cases = H. 
Holding costs  = [(q/2) *H *P(QJ)] the total cost equation for Π5 is written as  
Total costs = F’M+P(QJ)QJ + (QJ/q)S2 + [(q/2) *H *P(QJ)]         (5.36) 
The optimal order quantity is obtained by minimizing the total cost equation, 
which results in q* = sqrt [(2*QJ*S2)/(H*P(QJ))]           (5.37)   
Substituting in (5.36), the equation is written as, 
Π5opt. = [F’M + PM’(QJ)*QJ] + 2 * [sqrt [(PM’(QJ) * QJ * H * S2)/2]]   (5.38) 
Similarly, formulating the optimal costs, when H1 is purchasing directly from the 
manufacturer,  
Π6opt. = FM + PM(QJ)*QJ] + 2 * [sqrt [(PM(QJ) * QJ * H * S3)/2]]   (5.39) 
The concept of “Best Response” in the Game theory is employed as principle procedure to find 
out the Nash Equilibrium Point (solution). The procedure is mentioned below  
1. If H2 chooses to purchase its supplies by joining the Hospital Association (HA), then H1 
should opt the low preferable cost choice of purchasing between HA, GPO and I 
(individually).  
1.1. The total optimal cost equations are,  
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Π1opt. = [(A+F”M+P(Q1)Q1) - i(xn+2)/(n+2)] + 2 [sqrt(Q1 * S1 * H * P(Q1)/(2*(n+2))] 
Π4opt. = [FG + PG(Qn)QJ] + [2 * sqrt [(PG(Qn) * QJ * H * S3)/2]] 
Π6opt. = [FM + PM(QJ)QJ] + 2 * [sqrt [(PM(QJ) * QJ * H * S3)/2]] 
Here, from above minimization procedure, the optimized equations are deduced. Comparing 
the terms [(A+F”M+P(Q1)Q1) - i(xn+2)/(n+2)] from Π1opt. , [FG + PG(Qn)QJ] from Π4opt., and [FM 
+ PM(QJ)QJ] from Π6opt. ; The price set by the GPO comprises of fixed contracting costs 
set by the manufacturers, the price set by the manufacturers and some profit factor X. The 
term PG(Qn)QJ can be superseded by [FM + P(Qn)QJ +X]. The addition of profit factor ‘X’ and 
membership fee ‘FG’ to the product costs adds more value to the total costs when purchased 
through GPO. But when the purchase of supplies is done through HA, there is no profit 
factor, however,  there are other extra costs, which add value to the product costs. The 
administrative fees collected from manufacturers are utilized to cover the managerial 
expenses and add more services to the hospitals. When the goods are purchased directly 
from manufacturers, the price PM(QJ)QJ borne by the hospital will be more than the prices 
when purchased through other two choices. Hence, [(A+F”M+P(Q1)Q1) - i(xn+2)/(n+2)] < [FG 
+ PG(Qn)QJ] < [FM + PM(QJ)QJ]. Now comparing the terms 2 [sqrt(Q1 * S1 * H * 
P(Q1)/(2*(n+2))] from Π1opt. , [2 * sqrt [(PG(Qn) * QJ * H * S3)/2]] from Π4opt., and 2 * [sqrt 
[(PM(QJ) * QJ * H * S3)/2]] from Π6opt.. Here, when comparing the costs P(Q1), PG(Qn) and 
PM(QJ), as discussed earlier, purchasing via HA is less expensive than purchasing via GPO. 
According to the rule as number of orders increases, the ordering costs increase and 
inventory costs decreases. Since the cost per order, S1 is less than S3, it shows that π1opt. 
is a low-cost way of purchasing for the hospital [Dominant strategy: HA] .  
2. If H2 chooses the option purchasing through GPO, then H1 can choose the low cost option 
between the HA, GPO, and I. 
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2.1. The optimized cost equations are π2 opt. π4opt.., π6 opt. 
Π2opt. = [(A+F”M+P(Q1’)Q1’) - i(xn+1)/(n+1)] + 2 [sqrt(Q1’ * S1 * H * P(Q1’)/(2*(n+1))] 
Π4opt. = FG + PG(Qn)QJ] + [2 * sqrt [(PG(Qn) * QJ * H * S3)/2]]     
Π6opt. = [FM + PM(QJ)QJ] + 2 * [sqrt [(PM(QJ) * QJ * H * S3)/2]] 
Similar to the above explanation, the comparison of costs P(Q1’) Q1’, PG(Qn)QJ , and 
PM(QJ)QJ is made. It can be stated that π2opt. [Purchasing the supplies through the HA] is a 
preferable low-cost option rather than purchasing through its GPO or purchasing directly 
from the manufacturers [Dominant strategy: HA]. 
3. If H2 chooses the option of purchasing directly from the manufacturers then H1 can choose 
the low cost option between HA, GPO, and I (individual). 
3.1. The optimized cost equations are π2 opt., π4opt.., π6 opt. 
Π2opt. = [(A+F”M+P(Q1’)Q1’) - i(xn+1)/(n+1)] + 2 [sqrt(Q1’ * S1 * H * P(Q1’)/(2*(n+1))] 
Π4opt. = FG + PG(Qn)QJ] + [2 * sqrt [(PG(Qn) * QJ * H * S3)/2]]     
Π6opt. = [FM + PM(QJ)QJ] + 2 * [sqrt [(PM(QJ) * QJ * H * S3)/2]] 
By adopting the same strategies, π2opt. [Purchasing through HA] is chosen as preferable choice 
of purchasing the commodities [Dominant strategy: HA]. 
4. The dominant strategies for other conditions are determined by following the procedure as 
mentioned above. 
• The preferable option of purchasing for H2 is HA when H1 opts for HA. [Dominant 
strategy: HA] 
• When H1 chooses the option of purchasing through its GPO, then the preferable option 
for H2 is purchasing its supplies through HA to gain more profits. [Dominant strategy: 
HA] 
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• When H1 chooses the option of purchasing directly from manufacturers, then the 
preferable option for H2 is purchasing via. HA. [Dominant strategy: HA] 
The final best response point is [HA, HA], and this point is satisfying all conditions required of 
dominant pure strategy to be a Nash equilibrium point. 
Case 1.2: Here, NH=0, and that means hospitals H1 and H2 are checking to see whether they 
should combine their purchasing power (or merging or HA) or purchase through their respective 
GPOs (GP) and NG = n. 
 
Now writing the equation for Π1’, 
Π1’ = Z + [A + F”M + P(2QJ)*2QJ – i*(x2)]/ (2) 
The total cost equation can be expressed as, 
Total cost = Purchasing cost + Ordering cost + Holding cost 
Here, the purchasing costs for Π1’ = [[A+F”M+P(2QJ)2QJ]/(2)]; since only two hospitals 
are trying to merge the total quantity would be 2QJ 
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The ordering costs = [[QJ/q]*S1]. Here, the cost per order is S1. 
The holding cost per unit is considered same = H 
The holding costs for Π1’ = [(q/2)*H*P(2QJ)] The total costs equation is mentioned as 
shown in eq. (5.41) 
TC = [[A+F”M+P(2QJ)2QJ]/(2)] + [[QJ/q]*S1] + [(q/2)*H*P(2QJ)]      (5.40) 
Minimizing the total cost equation, results in optimal order quantity q* 
𝜕𝑇𝐶𝜕𝑞 = 0 
= 0 – [(S1 * QJ)/q^2] + [(H * P(2QJ))/2] = 0 
q* = sqrt [(2 * S1 * QJ)/(H * P(2QJ))]              (5.41) 
Substituting the eq. (5.41) in eq. (5.40) the final equation is, 
Π1’opt. = [[A+F”M+P(2QJ)2QJ]/(2)] + 2 * sqrt[ (QJ * S1 * H * P(2QJ))/2]  (5.42) 
Deriving the equation for total optimal costs for Π2’, that is either H1 or H2 is choosing 
the purchasing option of going through GPO (GP) and other hospital is purchasing 
directly from the manufacturers. 
Π2’ = Z + F”M + P(QJ)*QJ 
The purchasing costs for Π2’ = F”M+P(QJ)QJ 
The ordering costs  = (QJ/q)S1 (here, the cost per order is assumed as S1) 
The holding costs per unit are assumed to be same for all cases = H. 
Holding costs  = [(q/2) *H *P(QJ)] the total cost equation for Π2’ is written as  
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TC = F”M+P(QJ)QJ + (QJ/q)S1 + [(q/2) *H *P(QJ)]    (5.43) 
Minimizing the total cost results in optimal order quantity, 
𝜕𝑇𝐶𝜕𝑞 = 0 
0 = 0 – [(QJ * S1)/q^2] + [(H*P(QJ))/2] 
q* = sqrt [(2*QJ*S1)/(H*P(QJ))]              (5.44)   
Substituting in eq. (5.43), the equation is written as, 
Π2’opt. = F”M+P(QJ)QJ + sqrt[ (QJ * S1 * H * P(QJ))/2]         (5.45) 
Π3’opt. and Π4’ opt. are same as Π3 opt. and Π4 opt. respectively, since the hospitals are 
purchasing through their current registered GPOs. 
When hospitals H1 and H2 are purchasing their products directly from the 
manufacturers, the optimal total cost equations are written as,  
Π5opt. = [F’M + PM’(QJ)QJ] + 2 * [sqrt [(PM’(QJ) * QJ * H * S2)/2]] [When H2 purchases 
directly from the manufacturers]    
Π6opt. = FM + PM(QJ)QJ] + 2 * [sqrt [(PM(QJ) * QJ * H * S3)/2]] [When H1 purchases 
directly from the manufacturers]  
By deriving the optimized equations, it can be found if the Nash equilibrium point exists 
or. By following the rules as mentioned above, it can be shown that the preferable point 
is [GP, GP] and the payoff [Π3’opt., Π4’opt.], satisfying the conditions of Nash Equilibrium.
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
As addressed earlier, this study has mainly three contributions. In the first segment of the 
model, the goal was to determine the affordable option of purchasing for the hospitals H1 and 
H2, among the three choices; joining a Hospital Association (hospital society), buying through 
group purchasing organizations, and purchasing directly from the manufacturers. Based on this, 
a scenario is drawn, which includes two cases. The preferable option of purchasing is 
determined in every case, and for each case, a game theoretic model is created with the total 
cost equations as the payoffs. By adopting the procedure of best response, the Nash 
equilibrium point or the preferable point of purchasing is determined. Quantity discount contracts 
are used in the entire model; therefore the main rule here is, as the volume increases, the price 
per unit decreases.  
• When NH = NG = n, Here, the preferable option of purchasing for both the hospitals is 
purchasing via Hospital Association. 
• Similarly, When NH = 0 and NG = n, then the low cost option for H1 and H2 is purchasing 
through its own registered GPO.  
The proof of payoffs satisfying the conditions of Nash equilibrium is done for each case. 
Purchasing individually (I) might be the best choice only when the healthcare member wants to 
purchase very limited quantity such as physician prescribed medicines, some big operation 
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equipment’s, operational tools etc., and the entire price of the contract mainly depends on the 
negotiating capacity of each healthcare organization, and the volume of purchase.  
Different Lemmas are proposed in the second aspect of the model. Generally, the members in 
GPO will be more than the members in Hospital Association; this is because multiple healthcare 
organizations, which are in the close proximity geographically, combine their resources. Here, 
initially the assumption is made about the optimal point or the Nash equilibrium point, and the 
conditions are drawn for that payoff, in order to satisfy the rules of Nash equilibrium. Each 
lemma gives the conditions in relation to the number of members in the hospital association ‘n’ 
and the quantity (QJ) ordered by each of the hospital. 
The third aspect of the model is similar to the first aspect, but the main difference is purchasing 
is done based on an optimal order quantity. The main reason to implement this model is to 
avoid high inventory costs and to maintain correct demand relationship with the seller with a 
view to attain higher profits in the entire supply chain. The primary comparison is done between 
the quantity ordered, and the ordering costs versus inventory or holding costs. The best 
response points for each case are derived.  
6.1 Future Work: 
 
• Need to collect the real-time data about a Hospital Association and should perform 
analysis. 
• In the current model, the contract that is used for all the cases is the volume discount 
contract. Using other type of contracts such as sole –source contracts, buy-back 
contracts, can further extend this model.  
• We can extend the entire work, using a stochastic game, by varying the demands and 
costs in all the procurement models.
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